ABSTRACT
The approaches to human beings in the previous three chapters foundered on problems of normativity. Biology and psychology explain how the human mind as an empirical object works. History and the study of diversity show wide variations amongst human beings. And existentialism's emphasis on freedom drives home the difficulty of determining any fixed human “nature.” Nonetheless, normative issues — what we ought to think, feel, or do — remain. Insofar as human sciences (whether biology or history or anthropology) purport to provide anything like knowledge, they appeal to epistemic standards. Moreover, as forms of life, the practice of these sciences involves appeal to volitional standards. Even those not directly involved in these scientific and philosophical developments need to decide what to make of them. And as reflective thinkers, feelers, and actors, we find ourselves needing to decide how to think, feel, and choose. As existentialists rightly show, even refusal to see oneself as needing to make such decisions is an exercise of freedom, albeit in bad faith.
