ABSTRACT

Moral professionalism The phrase moral professionalism consists of two terms, which are both somewhat hard to define, albeit not to an equal degree. To start with the least complicated: in sociology the term professionalism usually refers to the conduct, objectives, and values that typify a profession, which in its turn has been defined as ‘a relatively “high status” occupation whose members apply abstract knowledge to solve problems in a particular field of endeavor’ (Burk 2002: 21). A professional can subsequently be characterized as someone with an expert body of knowledge and, for that reason, a considerable degree of discretion and professional autonomy (see also Cook 2002: 342-343). In general, he or she tends to place his own professional judgment above that of the management that supervises his work, based on the conviction that his training, education, and professional experience makes his or her judgment a more informed one compared to that of those at a higher level in the organization. It is above all this side of professionalism – loyalty to the profession instead of to the organization – which sets a profession apart from other occupations. The more elusive of the two terms is, of course, ‘moral’. Basically, as for instance Thomas Nagel put it in his famous The View from Nowhere (1986) and elsewhere, being moral – and moral reasoning – is primarily about placing ourselves, in one way or another, in the position of someone else for a moment. The fact that most people are more inclined to help their next of kin than unknown persons in far-away countries (even when the latter’s predicament is much greater) is from this perspective, although perhaps understandable and natural, often not moral. This view, of course, harks back to the time-honored rule (often called the ‘golden rule’) in ethics that one should treat the other (and not just the members of one’s own group) as one wants to be treated one-self. This is a dictum that goes as far back as Thales of Miletus, yet it also underpins the modern human rights doctrine. Moral philosopher Peter Singer, for instance, has along the same lines influentially argued that we have a moral duty to prevent the suffering of others, if we are in a situation that allows us to do so without significant (moral) cost to ourselves or others (1972). In the case of the military the problem is that the latter requirement is, of course, not always fulfilled. An example, then, of an attempt to come to grips with what moral professionalism could signify is the concept of ‘moral competence’, as introduced by Karssing (2006), which involves, first of all, awareness of the values, norms and interests that are present in a situation. This implies the ability to see, preferably in advance, which values are at risk and threatened with violation. Sometimes this is quite clear, but just as often it is not. A moral professional is someone who is able to see that there is an ethical question or dilemma, and to identify its underlying values, rules and interests. Knowing and identifying, however, are not enough by themselves, for knowing that there is a dilemma does not necessarily imply that one is also capable of making an adequate evaluation of the different alternatives. One, therefore, in addition needs judgment and the ability to communicate. The latter means that someone is able to discuss possible

solutions, but also knows how to explain the moral dimension to others who may not have the same awareness. Subsequently, one must be able and willing to act if that is what is called for, and to do so in a responsible way. It is most important, however, that one must be ready to be held accountable for one’s actions and decisions – this will be less of a problem, of course, if prudent reflection has accompanied the whole process. As far as moral professionalism in the military is concerned, another aspect should be added, namely, the impact of the confrontation with ethical questions and dilemmas on military personnel. This impact can be severe. Even if one is able to act in a responsible way when confronted with an ethical question or dilemma, and thus demonstrates the above mentioned aspects of moral professionalism, one’s peace of mind can still be damaged by the tragic choice one has to make. What is also required, then, is a good measure of resilience of the person who makes the decision to act or to refrain from action. This element brings us somewhat closer to what is specific to the military.