ABSTRACT
My approach to issues involving faith and reason is generally philosophical and systematic; but in saying that it is important to note that every philosophical system has its own views about the nature and scope of philosophy itself. For that reason and because of the particular need to distinguish the present chapter from other discussions that might appear under this title, I begin with a brief explanation of the expression ‘a thomist metaphysics’. Metaphysics is concerned with the nature of reality as it may be comprehended
in the most general terms. It is a small step from this to the claim that metaphysics investigates not just how things are as a matter of contingent fact, but also how they must and how they may be. This concern with what is essential, and hence with what is necessary and what is possible, arises from the aim of describing and understanding the nature of reality as such. The various sciences are focused on and defined by classes of empirical
objects and features. Metaphysicians, by contrast, are concerned with the natures of substance, causality, and time per se. In investigating these and other aspects of reality they are also enquiring into something yet more extensive, namely the nature and modes of existence. In the language of classical metaphysics, of which thomism is a part, they are concerned with being in general (ens commune). Works of reference often use the terms ‘thomist’ and ‘thomistic’ as equivalents
to characterise something as pertaining to the thought of Aquinas. Metaphysical themes recur throughout his copious writings including theological presentations and commentaries on works of Aristotle and others. But there are only two treatises on metaphysics as such: On the Principles of Nature (De Principiis Naturae)
and On Being and Essence (De Ente et Essentia). The latter is by far the more important and is required reading for anyone wishing to know about Aquinean philosophy.2 Both texts were composed while Aquinas was still a student (before 1256) and are among his earliest writings; both are short, and both set out in analytical fashion the basic elements of his neo-Aristotelian position. Although his metaphysical views matured in later life they did not change significantly. Where it is clear that the work of Aquinas himself is at issue the use of ‘thomist’
and ‘thomistic’ is unproblematic; but their application is often extended to cover a multitude of thinkers influenced by and ideas deriving from Aquinas, and in this there is potential for confusion.3 First, there is the issue of how close to the original the intendedly faithful interpretations of Aquinas may be. Second, is the fact that some who have been inspired by Aquinas have knowingly developed his thought along lines different to those which most disinterested commentators would take to be authentically Aquinean. As might be imagined this has given rise to some controversy. Particularly since
the revival of interest in Aquinas marked in 1879 by the encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris, there have been several movements which have sought accommodation between aspects of Aquinas’s thought and more recent philosophical systems such as those of Descartes and Kant. The best known of these syntheses is ‘transcendental thomism’, which tried to reinterpret Aquinas in terms of demands imposed by Kantian critical philosophy.4 And of late the expression ‘analytical thomism’ has been used to describe approaches combining methods and interests characteristic of Anglo-American analytical philosophy with ideas and doctrines drawn from Aquinas.5
