ABSTRACT
Japan’s course to war upon Great Britain and the attack upon Malaya were predictable. Once she had embarked upon her policy of carving out an empire for herself, based in part upon her conquests in China which began in real earnest in 1937, and euphemised as ‘The China Incident’, Japan was bound to come into collision sooner or later with those powers whose economic or emotional ties with China compelled them to oppose her. The collapse of Holland and France in 1940 laid open their eastern dependencies to Japanese aggression, and the British defeat at Dunkirk indicated that Britain herself would hardly be in a position to resist Japanese encroachments. Japan joined the Tripartite Pact on 27 September, 1940, linking her fortunes with those of Germany and Italy, but also ensuring that Japan retained a free hand in dealing with the Dutch East Indies. The discussion at the Imperial Conference of 19 September 1940, showed that the Japanese Government was fully aware of the likelihood that signing the pact would make future agreement on policy with the US extremely difficult. But the Army was pressing to conclude an agreement with a victorious Germany, and, as the Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, pointed out:
We are a great power with a strong navy in Far Eastern waters. To be sure, the United States may adopt a stern attitude for a while; but I think that she will dispassionately take her interests into consideration and arrive at a reasonable attitude. As to whether she will stiffen her attitude and bring about a critical situation, or will levelheadedly reconsider, I would say that the odds are fifty-fifty. 1
