ABSTRACT
Introduction The idea of abolishing nuclear weapons, or at least of disarming active nuclear arsenals, has received public endorsement from an international cast of former and current policy makers, military commanders, and nuclear experts across the political spectrum.1 The intellectual zeitgeist for reducing the role of nuclear weapons in world politics has never appeared more favorable than it does now. On the other hand, governments, including those currently in possession of nuclear weapons, move slowly, and interest in nuclear weapons on the part of currently non-nuclear states or threshold nuclear powers cautions against premature optimism. As well, scholars and others have warned of the cognitive complexity of the “second nuclear age” and the implications of nuclear weapons spread in Asia.2 This chapter engages the discussion about nuclear abolition from the broad perspective of strategy and policy, as follows. We first review some of the concepts related to enthusiasm for, or skepticism about, nuclear abolition. Second, we discuss some of the reasons why existing nuclear weapons states may be reluctant to part with these weapons, despite their downsides. Third, we perform a thought experiment analysis to show that, short of nuclear abolition, there may be a more attainable and realistic route toward the objective of nuclear restraint, including nuclear arms control and nonproliferation.
