ABSTRACT
Despite the fact that Scotland and Rogaland are very different in terms of size, ambitions and cultural differences on which to base regionalism, the factors contributing to the development of regionalism across time are similar in the two regions. Economic development appears to have played a key role in both cases, and for largely the same reasons. In neither region is the effect of economic growth restricted to the fiscal incentives provided by these developments, although these do play a part in both regions. Just as important is the impact of economic success on regional self-esteem. It seems that political peripherality is seen as unacceptable by people in economically central regions. The cultural reawakening that has taken place in the wake of the economic boom has arguably also contributed to regionalism. These developments in popular culture in both regions may be associated with their economic growth. In a growing economy, people are wealthier and have more money to spend on funding the popular culture sector. For instance, successful businesses may fund regional arts projects, allowing the cultural scene to develop. This may be important in order to attract human capital to the region, thereby improving the labour pool for the businesses operating in the region. Political elites may devote public resources towards culture for the same reason, but they may also use culture consciously in a bid to promote regionalism. In turn, successful regional cultural exports can reinforce the regional identity through making the identity itself as well as regional languages or dialects seem more attractive. This may contribute to reframing the regional identity as forward-looking and successful. The case selection consciously included two regions with different relationships to the European Union in order to examine whether European integration would interact with the other variables in any way. This does not appear to have been the case, but European integration has had an effect in its own right in the more recent surge of nationalism in Scotland. Thus, EU membership does seem to matter to the development of regionalism, and the institutional incentives that it provides can be crucial in building support for specific proposals such as devolution of power. The relationship between regional party systems and regionalism is complex. In some ways, the low levels of support for parties that have dominated national politics can be seen as a result of regionalism itself. The Norwegian Ap and the
British Conservatives are seen by many as opponents of regionalism – by some even as opponents of Rogaland and Scotland themselves – and have lost support partly because of voter concerns for what is best for the region. On the other hand, the low levels of regional representation in the national governments of these two parties have led to disaffection with the regions’ influence in national politics and a desire to regionalize politics in order to win back power over regional affairs. In Scotland, this was framed as a desire to address a democratic deficit in the political system. The people of Rogaland did not see themselves as a demos, but they were nevertheless dissatisfied with the lack of regional representation in the national government. Finally, globalization is correlated with regionalism in both regions. In Scotland, the establishment of political institutions aiming to support the region in the global economy corresponds to the globalization theories, but it seems likely that the establishment of these organizations is largely a consequence of nationalism, rather than a cause thereof. In Rogaland, the weakening of the central state never occurred in the manner expected by the globalization school, as the public ownership of the petroleum resources forced businesses to relate to a powerful state that was far from being at the mercy of the whims of international capital. There has thus not been as much need for the establishment of regional organizations, although some have still been created in recent years (such as Greater Stavanger Economic Development in 1999 and Innovasjon Rogaland in 2002). A particular feature of both Scotland and Rogaland is that they are the main hubs for North Sea petroleum production in their respective countries. This raises the question of whether the reliance on petroleum in itself has an impact on regionalism, or whether the findings, in particular on the impact of economic growth and prosperity, are generalizable to other prosperous peripheries. This final chapter raises some theoretical perspectives as to why petroleum regions might differ from other regions, before discussing the impact of economic development in other European regions. This will shed light on whether the relationship between economic development and regionalism works in a similar fashion in regions whose prosperity is not based on petroleum resources. Admittedly, the reliance on petroleum is far stronger in Rogaland than in Scotland. Rogaland is a much smaller region than Scotland in terms of population, and its economy is accordingly also smaller. Petroleum is therefore the dominant industry in the region, profoundly affecting the regional economy. Scotland has a more diversified economy, with petroleum production concentrated around the city of Aberdeen. The largest cities, Glasgow and Edinburgh, are based around other industries and are not particularly strongly affected by petroleum. This difference notwithstanding, the analysis in Chapter 6 showed that the presence of petroleum resources off the Scottish coast has been important in framing a fiscal incentives discourse in Scotland, and it is therefore highly relevant to ask what the impact of economic development on regionalism would have been in the absence of these natural resources.
