ABSTRACT
It is sometimes the fate of writers that the breadth and theoretical sophistication of their thought is obscured by the literary legacy of an otherwise felicitous turn of phrase. This is certainly the case with Carl von Clausewitz, whose formula “war is the pursuit of politics by other means” is cited whenever the discussion turns to the origins and purposes of war. Yet despite the ubiquity of his formula, Clausewitz’ monumental On War1 rarely receives the reading it deserves, and above all the question of just what this famous phrase might mean is all too often insuffi ciently pursued-as if all the intentions of its author were as plain as day. Still, modern Clausewitz scholarship has managed to dispel much of the distortions and myths that have plagued a suffi cient understanding of Clausewitz (the history of which alone is worthy of a separate study), and the result is that it has become diffi cult (once again) to ignore his relevance.2 Above all, it has become clear that the assumption that Clausewitz is relevant only for discussions of large wars between armies organized by states, or only as an early proponent of total war who saw in the fi gure of the decisive battle the defi ning essence of military confl ict, or as an outdated theorist who lay undue stress on the moral character or “genius” of commanders, must necessarily fall apart upon any attentive reading of On War. Clausewitz has a great deal to teach us both about the wars we have faced and those which we now face in the twenty-fi rst century: small, irregular wars, including that whole range of so-called “asymmetrical confl icts” between traditional centers of power and shifting, non-territorial, ideologically or religiously driven factions.
