ABSTRACT
When Coalition forces entered Kuwait in 1991 there was a ratio of one contractor to every 100 soldiers. During this campaign contractors undertook a range of tasks focused on technical and logistical support. What they did not do was provide armed security. When US and UK troops crossed over into Iraq in 2003 the ratio had risen to an estimated one contractor to ten soldiers, but this time with a substantial number being armed. A Congressional Budget Office report published in August 2008 now puts the ratio at 1 to 1.1 As with the first Gulf War, contractors have undertaken technical and logistical tasks, while the presence of armed contractors has seen security tasks outsourced. These include close protection, convoy protection and asset protection, including aspects of the country’s infrastructure, and military and law enforcement training. Today, they continue to fulfil these responsibilities. The reason there were far fewer contractors after the war in 1991 was because no reconstruction of the country was necessary and no insurgency occurred after the fighting was over. The situation in 2003, when Coalition forces entered Iraq, was very different. Not only has it been necessary to rebuild large sections of the country’s infrastructure, but reconstruction has had to take place in the face of a fierce insurgency, the result of which has been a substantial increase in the number of contractors, including armed contractors, over the number used during the Gulf War in 1991. This chapter explains why it has been necessary for Coalition forces and US and UK government agencies to employ PSCs in Iraq to support the reconstruction programme and help train the new Iraqi Army and police force. In particular, the chapter will argue that their presence is the result of a catalogue of political mistakes by the Bush administration that allowed an insurgency to take hold in parts of the country, and which the US military were unable to prevent as a result of having too few troops on the ground. Consequently, there was an urgent need for additional actors able to engage in security tasks if reconstruction in the country was to proceed, and to support the military and police training programmes. In the case of the reconstruction programme, it is difficult to determine whether PSCs have had a positive or negative impact. In all likelihood, their impact has been mixed. What is less contested has been the need for PSCs
for reconstruction to continue. This chapter first explores the planning stage of the operation, explaining why the administration got it so wrong in Iraq, before discussing Saddam’s strategy to counter an American invasion. The fact that the administration failed to judge the political/strategic environment correctly, and that the insurgency was well organised and led, made a breakdown in security almost inevitable. The fourth section examines the decision by the Pentagon to undertake to de-Ba’athificate all public posts, which ultimately added to the problem of maintaining law and order in the country. The final section touches on some of the reasons why PSCs have been able to rise to the challenge posed by Iraq, reasons which will be discussed in greater detail in the chapters that follow.
