ABSTRACT
There are various objections which are commonly raised against the kind of ethical system that we have been developing. One of these is that there seems to be a lack of authority about ethical maxims having no basis except that suggested in the foregoing chapters. I will consider this objection in the present chapter. Let us think, in the first place, what we mean by “authority”. There is human authority, and, for the orthodox, there is Divine authority. There is the authority of Truth and there is the authority of conscience. In orthodox morals, all these combine. “Why ought I to do so and so?” “Because it is the Will of Godbecause it is what the community approve-because it is an eternal Truth that you ought to do so and so-because your conscience, if you will but listen to it, tells you that this is what you ought to do.” In face of this ethical broadside, it is hoped that your carnal desires will shrink abashed. A community where all these kinds of authority are recognized will, it is thought, be more apt to do what it ought than a community governed by more mundane considerations. This is held to be
so obvious that it is not submitted to any statistical test. I think that, if it were, the result might be surprising. Let us compare two communities, say thirteenth century Italy and modern England. In the former, practically everybody believed that rape led to Hell unless followed by due repentance. In modern England, few believe this. But, if one is to believe Salimbene, monks in thirteenth century Italy were more addicted to rape than any except a few recognized criminals in modern England. I think a broad survey of history makes it extremely doubtful whether such moral precepts as have obvious ethical value are more obeyed where they have the above four-fold authority than in more free-thinking communities. This, however, is by the way, and it is time to come to grips with the difficulties that are likely to be felt.
