ABSTRACT
Let us suppose a situation reached in which East and West alike are convinced that a nuclear war would be a disaster to all parties and that steps for the preservation of peace, if they were possible, would be supremely desirable. The obstacles to a peaceful policy are of various kinds. First, and most serious, is mutual fear and the suspicion of bad faith on the other side. The second obstacle is a fear of loss of face: neither side can bear to appear forced into concessions. A third difficulty, which is much emphasized but does not seem to me so grave as the other two, is the ideological dispute: a great many people on each side believe that the way of life for which their side stands is vastly better than the other and that nothing whatever must be done to give the other a chance of global success. I think that a policy of conciliation, if it is to win the support of the powerful, must take account of these difficulties and look for measures by which they may be minimized. I do not know whether such measures will be adopted and, if they are, I do not know what form they will take. In what
follows, I will make suggestions as to a possible course that conciliation might take, but without wishing to insist upon just these measures if others having the same purpose were found more acceptable.
