ABSTRACT
A WEEK before Tripoli fell, on the 14th January, there opened the Casablanca Conference. I suppose that the ordinary man thinks first of the formula of ‘unconditional surrender’ which was produced at that conference, in a manner and for motives which are variously reported. It also took a number of strategical decisions. One was that the next operation after North Africa had been cleared would be to invade and capture Sicily. In other words, Sicily was meant to be the logical conclusion and rounding off of the North African campaign, not the start of the invasion of Europe. In order to finish things off in Africa as soon as possible a reorganization of the chain of command was decided on. To put it briefly, General Alexander was given complete control of all the forces in the field actually engaged with the Germans. General Eisenhower and his H.Q. remained responsible for the planning of future operations and the organization of the lines of communication. Alexander’s H.Q. was designated 18th Army Group because it consisted of First and Eighth Armies plus the 2nd U.S. Corps and the French 19th Corps. Alexander’s H.Q. staff was to be drawn from G.H.Q. Middle East. It was to be an extremely small H.Q. so that only a few officers in Cairo would be lucky, especially as some room would have to be left for American officers. Dick McCreery would carry on as Chief of General Staff and Terence Airey as Brigadier General Staff, Intelligence. I was extremely pleased to be told that I had been selected as G1 Intelligence. This was my second promotion within three months: I had hardly got used to the rank of major when I found myself putting up an extra pip.
