ABSTRACT
The spring offensive of May 1944 which culminated in the capture of Rome, was one of the most remarkable examples of generalship in the whole course of the war. Enough has already been said to make it obvious that the Italian campaign was never an affair of battering our way onwards, for we never had sufficient numbers to make such tactics possible. Success was always due to stratagems. Never was greater effort devoted to this than during March and April The problem can be stated in fairly simple terms, as is the case with almost all military problems. First of all our landing craft had all gone home for Overlord so that we no longer had the means to mount an amphibious attack and must advance overland. Secondly, experience had shown that for a successful land attack in Italian conditions the attacker must have at least a three to one superiority in infantry. Looking at the terrain it was quite clear that a large scale offensive east of the Apennines along the Adriatic coast was quite out of the question. The country was extremely difficult and even a successful advance could not lead anywhere. The main weight must therefore be brought to bear on the west coast. To launch a large scale offensive from the Anzio bridgehead was impossible because no more troops could be maintained there than were already there. The Anzio force must admittedly go over to the attack at some stage of the offensive, and this was an enormously valuable card to play; but it was inescapable that the main effort must be made somewhere between Cassino and the sea. This reasoning seemed to us so obvious that it must, one supposed, be equally obvious to Kesselring.
