ABSTRACT
Ireturned to find that progress was as difficult in northern Italy as it was on the Western Front. In fact the two fronts were now more closely connected than ever. As General Alexander states in his Despatch, the main factor determining his strategy was the decision by General Eisenhower, as Supreme Allied Commander in the West, that it would be necessary to fight a winter campaign on that front in order to bring about the collapse of German resistance in the spring of 1945. In other words both in France and in Italy we had missed the chance of a sudden decision. I do not know enough about the circumstances on the Western Front to say whether it would have been better to concentrate all the Allied strength on the left flank. The fact that this strategy was strongly advocated then and defended later by General Montgomery, and that it would have meant giving him the leading role, does not by any means prove that it was wrong. It seemed obvious to most of us then that the alternative strategy, of moving forward allied forces all along the line and engaging the enemy on a long front, though safe and steady, was unlikely to be speedy. We had missed our chance in Italy when the Anvil forces were removed to take their place on the right of Eisenhower’s long line. Now both of us had to fight a war of attrition to keep the Germans at full stretch and wear them down until a state was reached where a decisive blow could be delivered.
