ABSTRACT
On the morning of 8th November, Eighth Army entered Mersa Matruh after a stubborn German rearguard had kept them out overnight. At the same time the forces under the command of General Eisenhower were landing in French North Africa. In G.H.Q. Middle East we had for some time been aware of the imminence of this operation and also of the date. I was told of it, if I remember, before Alamein began. It seemed an inevitable complement. Viewed from Cairo the North African coastline seemed to stretch out to the crack of doom. Now that Eighth Army had doubled in size it looked quite possible to push on past El Agheila and even get to Tripoli, a goal which for long had dazzled our eyes in the distance. But we had always assumed that the enemy, if driven out of Tripolitania, would withdraw without any fuss to Tunisia, and what the French attitude would be was dubious. They had already allowed the enemy to use Tunisian ports and roads for supply, and though they might not be prepared to fight on the side of the Germans the attitude of the French Mediterranean Fleet, occupying inactively large areas of Alexandria Harbour, seemed to show that they would not give us any co-operation. It seemed obvious therefore that a force from somewhere must start at the other end and work its way to meet us. It also seemed a natural method of deploying American strength, and I knew that this strategy was being strenuously recommended from Cairo by the U.S. Military Attaché.
