ABSTRACT
The competitiveness discourse clearly has a demonstrably pervasive grip on the thinking, policy and practice around regional development. It infuses much of the theoretical debates that have been struggling to catch up with and rationalize policy practice; it shapes the metrics and indicators of regional performance and ‘success’ which are used to help spread and sustain its logic; it dominates the strategic imperatives for regions; and acts to subjugate and constrain the choice of policy approaches pursued. Quite simply, competitiveness has been elevated to the status of a natural law in the modern capitalist economy. The appeal of place competitiveness to policy makers at all spatial scales is
easily understood when considering competitiveness ostensibly as an idea, promoted by particular and powerful interests. The very vague and nebulous nature of the competitiveness concept can then serve to act as one of its principal strengths for policy makers. It becomes a veritable garbage can into which all relevant strategic actions for the support of particular goals can be thrown. For cities and regions, the most striking characteristic of competitiveness strategies is indeed their extreme vagueness and flexibility over time. In the event, the commitment to competitiveness can thus be interpreted as authorizing key players in urban and regional governance to adapt to circumstances and opportunities as and when they arise, and especially as they have been proposed by potential investors, notably in the property development sector (Bristow and Lovering, 2006). At times, competitiveness can also be used strategically to justify the support of particular ailing local businesses, perhaps for political purposes or electoral gain. At other times, the cloak of competitiveness usefully absolves local policy makers from responsibility, inasmuch as the winds of global competition and change can be conveniently presented as variables which are essentially outside local responsibility and control. Perhaps more disturbingly, however, the notion of competitiveness as an
idea backed by powerful interests also highlights its potential to achieve hegemonic status such that, in spite of its limitations, it becomes very difficult
to conceive of any alternative, at least at the level of discourse. Competitiveness has become a banal, common-sense notion – competitiveness is simply ‘the way it is’. Indeed, as Fougner (2006: p. 169) observes, ‘the problem of international competitiveness [is] a seemingly given one that states cannot but attend to. There is seemingly no alternative but to compete – unless, that is, a state should be so unfortunate as to be excluded from the competitive game altogether for structural reasons – and thus little in the literature pointing beyond the competition state.’ Whilst alternative discourses around cooperation have been conceived (see, for example, Bunzl, 2001) and progress made in the development of alternative economic spaces, these have as yet failed to induce any systematic or global transformation in the dominant thinking. The obdurate hold of competitiveness thinking is not surprising, given its
central place in the dominant force that is neoliberalism. The ideology of international competitiveness is propagated globally and is predicated upon the contemporary dominance of a neoliberal rationality of government. This is characterized by the constitution of the market as the ideal in relation to which governance should be orientated, with governance rationality derived from arranged forms of entrepreneurial and competitive behaviour, legitimized where there is perceived to be market failure or imperfection (Fougner, 2006). As George (1999) states, ‘the central value of … neoliberalism itself is the notion of competition – competition between nations, regions, firms and of course between individuals. Competition is central because it separates the sheep from the goats, the men from the boys [sic] and the fit from the unfit. It is supposed to allocate all resources, whether physical, natural, human or financial, with the greatest possible efficiency’ (cited in McDowell, 2004; p, 146). Thus, the promotion of competitiveness is critical to the maintenance and reproduction of the capitalist hegemony within and beyond advanced capitalist countries (Cammack, 2006). Within this context it evidently becomes very difficult for individual nations
to opt out of the competitiveness game without being seen as attempting to manage expectations downwards or to lack ambition. As Layard (2005) points out, the first worker to suggest shorter trading hours for lower wages is likely to have his commitment questioned. The same can be said for individual governments at national, regional and city scales, particularly given that perceptions of economic management remain one of the key overriding drivers of electoral success. Competitiveness-speak may create a trap for policy makers from which, once entrapped, they struggle to break free. To fail to pursue competitiveness or to opt out of the competitiveness game completely, might be regarded as either a sign of weakness or a submission to defeat by erstwhile rivals. It would thus appear as if there is no alternative for places but to adopt
competitiveness-orientated policies. The story of inescapable globalization, competitiveness and economic neoliberalism is indeed a very pervasive one, such that even ideas that intuitively appear to challenge its orthodoxy are subsumed to its clutches. One might argue, for instance, that the growing
interest in the role of cultural creativity in cities has been hijacked by the competitiveness project inasmuch as the dominant thinking (propelled by key authors such as Richard Florida) sees them as ostensibly being about developing greater place attractiveness (competitiveness) and not about celebrating the uniqueness and diversity of local and regional economies per se. Similarly, there is evidence that welfare and social policies are being reconfigured to support economic competitiveness and the pursuit of growth (see Chapter 5). As Massey (2000: p. 282) observes, ‘every attempt at radical otherness [becomes] quickly commercialized and sold or used to sell … With all of this, one might as well ask what are, and where are, the possibilities for doing things differently?’ The growing awareness of the limitations of competitiveness-oriented poli-
cies for regions makes these questions especially pertinent. Furthermore, the CPE approach used throughout this volume provides a useful framework within which to begin to answer them, since, as has been demonstrated, it provides revealing insights into the ways and means by which prominent ideas are spread, the political dynamics of their evolution, and their utility for advancing particular policy goals and discouraging others. In emphasizing that competitiveness is a social and political construct, the CPE approach also usefully highlights that it is not immune to challenge and resistance. Whilst economic imaginaries such as competitiveness can be discursively constructed and materially reproduced at different sites, and on different scales, they are only ever likely to be partially constituted and will remain contingent. As Jessop (2005: p. 146) observes, the process of material reproduction ‘always occurs in and through struggles conducted by specific agents, typically involves the asymmetrical manipulation of power and knowledge, and is liable to contestation and resistance’. This means that there will always remain space for competing imaginaries to challenge the dominant ones and, as this volume has demonstrated, actual practices may vary significantly in the domains of policies and institutions. In other words, competitiveness is recontextualized as it is rolled out, replicated and reproduced across different spatial scales. Context and scale thus appear to matter, in part at least. The possibility that competitiveness may be contested raises a number of
critical sets of questions about the sort of alternative imaginaries that might emerge, how and whether they constitute an antagonistic challenge or countermovement to competitiveness, and from where they are likely to emanate. First, given its foundational role in cracking the whip of competitiveness and setting the extra-local rules of the game, there are fundamental questions to be asked regarding the apparent immutability of neoliberalism and the scope which exists to effect a fundamental transformative shift in its status, its privileging of economic rationality and the imperative of competitiveness at the grand level or global and national scale. This raises questions regarding the catalytic forces for change – forces which appear to be gathering momentum in a global economy increasingly characterized by economic instability and tangible concerns regarding the material limits of capitalism.
