ABSTRACT
At the turn of the millennium, South Asia under the shadow of nuclear weapons had acquired the dubious reputation of being “the most dangerous place” on earth, as President Bill Clinton once remarked.1 Since then, it has remained the site of a continuing debate on whether nuclear weapons induce stability or instability between hostile powers. Pessimists argue that a nuclear-strategic relationship is inherently unstable because it allows risk-taking and because the spectre of loss of control always lurks in the background. Optimists contend that, on the contrary, states in possession of nuclear weapons uniformly exhibit abundant caution and eschew risk-taking beyond a limited point. India and Pakistan provide a useful case to weigh the relative merits of the two perspectives. On the face of it, the pessimists are right because the subcontinental neighbours have been involved in four major crises – in 1990, 1999, 2001-2 and 2008-9 – since their acquisition of nuclear weapons in the mid-to-late 1980s. On the other hand, it is also true that while they fought three wars in the region’s pre-nuclear era – in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971 – the advent of nuclear weapons has produced crises, but not wars.2
