ABSTRACT
The Movimiento de Liberación Nacional – Tupamaros (MLN-T) has one of the most interesting regenerative histories of any insurgent actor. After an early brush with defeat, the group learnt the importance of being able to replace losses with new recruits. Over the years that followed, the Tupamaros were able not only to develop such a capacity, but also to expand their membership. The group’s armed struggle intensified as a result. Indeed, by 1971, The Economist suggested that the MLN-T was on the verge of launching an ‘armed takeover’ of the Uruguayan state.1 The next 18 months, however, did not witness the formation of a Tupamaro government. Rather, in the face of a concerted and unrestrained assault by the Uruguayan armed forces, the MLN-T’s ability to replace its losses with new recruits weakened. Unable to reverse this trend, the MLN-T eventually disappeared from the Uruguayan scene. This chapter will seek to uncover why the MLN-T’s previously-strong capacity for regeneration weakened. To assist this undertaking, this chapter is divided into six sections. The first three of these are contextual in nature, discussing: (1) the flow-on effects of the Cuban Revolution, and Uruguay’s socio-economic problems of the mid-twentieth century; (2) characteristics of the MLN-T itself (such as the organisation’s structure and recruitment process); and (3) the Uruguayan Government’s security forces. The fourth and fifth sections, meanwhile, will focus on the MLN-T’s capacity to regenerate; detailing the organisation’s three different regenerative phases, as well as analysing the relative strength of an increase in attrition and a decrease in recruitment as catalysts of regenerative decay, and the dynamics of these factors. Finally, the sixth section will provide a summary of the chapter and its key findings.
