ABSTRACT

Introduction Economics has recently taken an “ontological turn,” at least among its avowedly heterodox traditions. One group of researchers that has been very much involved in this is that referred to by various commentators as the “Cambridge School.”1 Central here is the ontologically oriented project instituted under the auspices of the Cambridge Social Ontology Group (or CSOG).2 A key feature of the project is its conception and analysis of open and closed systems. The Cambridge School has done much to try and clarify and overcome problems encountered in the modern discipline of economics. In doing so, the Group draws extensively on the categories of open and closed systems. In particular, it utilizes the terms open and closed systems to reference relevant ontological and methodological distinctions and to voice specific criticisms of mainstream economics. There are alternative approaches to utilizing the categories of open and closed systems in economics. Chick and Dow (2005) and Mearman (2005), for example, start out by examining how terms such as openness and closure are used in other disciplines. These authors do not centrally concern themselves with event regularities. Instead they explore the possibilities of introducing these terms and their given meanings in economics. Chick and Dow (2005: 364), for instance, examine the notions of open and closed systems found in the Oxford English Dictionary. Contributors to the different positions openly profess a pluralistic orientation. Given the critical stance taken by the Cambridge School, some may (and do) doubt (the legitimacy of) its claim to pluralism. Such doubts will be encouraged by any explicit charges of lack of pluralism leveled at the Cambridge School. I am thinking perhaps especially those advanced by Mearman, an important contributor to the alternative approach to analyzing open and closed systems. Specifically, his concern is that the School’s approach to defining open and closed systems results in methodological recommendations that are insufficiently pluralist in orientation. To reassure Mearman and others who may reach similar conclusions, I shall concentrate my efforts here on dispelling what is essentially a misunderstanding of the Cambridge position. In doing so, I first provide an account of the concep-

tions of open and closed systems defended by the Cambridge Group. Second, I discuss the implications of these conceptions for pluralism. In particular, I show that neither the conceptions themselves, nor the methodological recommendations that follow, conflict with the Group’s claim to adopting an overtly pluralist orientation.