ABSTRACT
Until the collapse of the USSR, and the subsequent cataclysmic effects, organised crime was essentially a domestic affair, even though transnational patterns were evident. Some States chose to see the phenomenon holistically,1
while others preferred to view each underlying offence in isolation from the organised nature of the group. Similarly, requests for international cooperation such as extradition and mutual legal assistance were made on the basis of the underlying offence. The post-1990 era, with the advent of globalised trade and physical movement of persons, witnessed an increase in organised crime, originating especially from the former Eastern bloc, necessitating a different approach to the problem.2 Two factors have generally contributed to the eruption of organised crime at the dawn of the 21st century: the emergence of ‘weak’ States and corruption.3 The former refers to the institutional capacity of States to govern legitimately, effectively administer justice and demand obeisance from the entire population. To the effect that the vast majority of South American States and Russia have been unsuccessful in achieving these ends, they are seen as ‘weak’. Moreover, in this environment of a weak State, a thriving poor population provides the cauldron in which criminality multiplies. Corruption further exacerbates the situation,4
as does the ability of such groups to launder their criminal proceeds in tax havens where banking regulations are relaxed.5
