ABSTRACT
Abba Eban's letter of 23 November 1953 began a chain of formal steps which continued until 24 March 1954. The UN SecretaryGeneral, Dag Hammarskjold, immediately cabled the Foreign Minister of Jordan, transmitting the contents of the Israeli ambassador's letter and inviting a representative of the Jordanian Government 'to discuss with [him the] implementation of [the] matter referred to' in that letter. l The UNSG then undertook a series of informal consultations with UN delegates aimed at narrowing differences. In an effort to ensure the success of the proposed conference and to counteract Jordanian fears of being forced by a loose agenda into discussing general questions of peace with Israel, Hammarskjold suggested to the British Minister of State, Selwyn Lloyd, that he would be willing to become involved personally by chairing the opening sessions and delegating Ralph Bunche to continue as his representative thereafter. The SecretaryGeneral was initially hoping to convene the conference in January, in Jerusalem if necessary. 2
Confusion over Israeli tactics and goals The invocation of Article XII was a legalistic manoeuvre which turned out to be fraught with political complications. One of the reasons for its ultimate failure to result in a high-level meeting
between Israeli and Jordanian representatives was confusion and a lack of clarity of purpose in the minds of the initiators of the demarche.
