ABSTRACT
It will have become apparent, particularly from the discussion in the preceding chapter, that the political hostilities and antipathies faced by the Annan reform programme almost immediately upon its release were severe. They consumed and then sapped the energies of all the actors in the drama of change that took place at UN headquarters in New York. In consequence, the world organization’s reform ground to an incomplete, messy and dispiriting halt. The problems ran deeper than those associated with normal political con-
testation. The ideological gulf that had opened between North and South, in all the permutations of that categorization, was so great that it seemed as if both sides had been talking completely past one another. This deep, even paradigmatic, contestation between the South and North poles of global political opinion had, in this instance, overtaken and substantially buried the Secretary-General’s fondest hopes for his organization’s renewal. The commonlanguage so basally necessary for progress and change had seemingly disintegrated under pressure from its plethora of dialects. The question, then, becomes ‘what, if anything, to do now?’ The probable
answer is ‘nobody really knows’. The magnitude of the problem, however, need not necessarily deter either actors or authors from hazarding suggestions. What follows is a short and admittedly tentative list. 1. To begin with, it seems clear that, for the foreseeable future, ‘grand
reform’ of the UN is off the agenda. I do not share the view that it should have been off the agenda from the outset. But now, having been tried and to a great extent found wanting, more modest and more contained proposals for change at the UN are appropriate. Reflecting on the recent process, one influential, moderate Asian ambassador said to me that it might be best now to take just five to ten concrete proposals and aim to have them implemented within a fixed period – perhaps three years. In the present circumstances, that would seem to be a viable and sensible approach. The reforms selected would
be necessary and significant. At the same time, they would need to be such that the political costs of a failure to agree upon them would not be so great that member states would be tempted to walk away from the wider negotiating table. However frustrating or inapt it may seem to those, like the present author, who wish simply that the world organization would pick up sticks and get its act together, just now, incremental and graduated change seems the only feasible way forward. 2. It is critical that any new programme of reform, however moderate and
modest, must be backed by forceful and skilful political leadership. Part of the problem with the recent endeavour was that no major nation or coalition of nations was willing to own, stand up, and fight for the Secretary-General’s programme. There were, to be sure, a clutch of European and Scandinavian delegations, and the Canadian one, which were supportive and made thoughtful contributions to debate. The major players, however, did not. Most importantly, perhaps, the US was uninterested and then, in the personality of John Bolton, destructive of any meaningful compromise. If the history of UN reform has demonstrated anything, it is that US support is invaluable, and its opposition fatal. America need not lead the charge, and in the present, contested political environment it would probably be a provocation for it to do so. But its influence and determined facilitation is crucial. More than that, political champions are also required in the capitals. In the hermetically sealed environment of the UN in New York, nothing may seem possible. What would give reform real push, however, is presidential or prime ministerial drive. If capitals do not much care what happens, one should not be surprised that reform will stagnate. 3. Strong leadership from the Secretary-General is also an important pre-
condition for success. Kofi Annan demonstrated this quality in the run-up to the reform negotiations. Then, however, the dramatic slump in his standing, particularly when combined with his private and personal struggles, took him out of the field just when his captaincy and batting ability were most required. The next reforming Secretary-General will need to do better. That, in turn, suggests that a significantly reformed process for selecting the occupant of the office is required (see Keating, 2007). 4. It may seem all too obvious, but there does not seem to be much point in
pursuing major policy or structural change unless the P-5 is either on board or agnostic. This suggests that a great deal of private discussion and negotiation among the existing permanent members, and with them, is a necessary precondition for making significant alterations. It is absolutely necessary if Charter change is in contemplation. This need not mean that all five members must agree. They did not in 1965, when the Security Council was first expanded. But, at the very least, the political costs of disagreement must be such that abstention will be preferred to dissension. 5. Consensus constitutes an enormous impediment to progress. Particularly
in any highly contested and emotionally charged political environment, such reforms as may be agreed to by consensus are likely at best to be anodyne,
and at worst to be meaningless. Rosemary Righter put the matter well. ‘The consensus procedure of UN conferences resembles an enormously elaborate mating ritual that ends with the pretence of a consummation that has not taken place’ (Righter, 1995, 138). The most involved and committed of my interviewees, whether from North or South, were as one in the view that the achievement of any really meaningful reform must involve jettisoning consensus in favour of majority voting. This need not be simple majority. It may be weighted majority. For progress to occur, however, the ballot is critical. 6. The preceding suggestions are straightforward. But none of them really
tackles the problem of how to move forward when the contenders in debate either do not, or make no effort to, take the other side seriously – when the posture of confrontation is more important than any concordance founded on compromise. In this circumstance, it would appear essential to inject independent thinking into the arena. The establishment of independent commissions of inquiry in relation to discrete but politically complex problems is one strategy for doing so that has achieved some success (see Luck, 2000, 89). Success is not guaranteed, as the fate of the High-Level Panel and Millennium Project reports has illustrated plainly. Nevertheless, even these have set a broadly agreed-upon conceptual framework within which the UN’s future over the next decade may be envisioned, and from which incremental, cumulative changes may be drawn and given effect. Another strategy that has proven successful, particularly in the human rights sphere, has been to open discussion to a much greater extent to contributions from civil society organizations. The injection of a greater plurality of views in this way would have the effect of reducing the insularity and inwardness of current diplomatic deliberations in New York and increasing political pressure for the achievement of defined and meaningful objectives in the interests of visible constituencies. 7. At the same time as injecting impartial inputs into UN deliberations,
steps should also be taken to improve the quality of their outputs. The key idea here is to strengthen the transparency and accountability of the UN’s deliberative forums (Luck, 2007, 653). One means of doing this may be to introduce a rolling series of evaluative reviews of each organ’s activities and performance. In addition, therefore, to each principal organ producing an annual report, an independent mechanism should be set in place to examine the report and to make recommendations for constructive adaptation and change. Clearly, it would not be appropriate for such mechanisms to secondguess Councils and committees on political matters. These are properly the province of member states’ representatives. However, such mechanisms – which may resemble a parliamentary standards commissioner, organizational ombudsman or institutional auditor, or some innovative combination of the three – could play an invaluable role in setting down recommendations for improvements in the rules, procedures, practices, conduct and finances of each of the major deliberative bodies. Each such independent office would be small, contracting out its major evaluative work in order to enhance its
expertise and promote its independence. Any such independent UN office or officer might also work in collaboration with a small, select committee chosen from the organ in question, so that political impetus may be given to the outcomes of the rolling evaluations thus instituted. 8. In the interests of greater accountability, renewed consideration might
also be given to the use of judicial review (Zifcak, 2005, 42). The UN Charter provides in Article 24(2) that the Security Council shall act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN. It may therefore be assumed that it is not to act arbitrarily, beyond the scope of the Charter or in contradiction to those purposes and principles. The Charter does not provide any explicit power to the International Court of Justice to review Security Council resolutions or those of other organs for compatibility with the Charter and its underlying doctrines. Nevertheless, in the Lockerbie Case (Preliminary Objections), it appears to have been accepted that the Court may check Security Council decisions for conformity.1 The Court might, therefore, be capable of assuming a role in determining the boundaries of power possessed and exercised not just by the Security Council, but also by other designated institutional organs. It is unlikely that the Security Council, in particular, would be enthused by
such a development. Nevertheless, Article 96 of the Charter provides that the Security Council and the General Assembly may themselves seek an advisory opinion from the Court on any legal question with respect to their powers. The Secretary-General may also seek such an opinion with the consent of the General Assembly. These legal avenues through which accountability may be strengthened are greatly underutilized. The clarity gained thereby might provide an important benchmark against which the activities and performance of the UN organs may be assessed, and upon which desirable reforms to deliberative processes may be founded. Judicial review, for example, may have added significant jurisprudential weight to the argument that the Security Council should employ ‘just war’ criteria in determining whether and when the international community should act in pursuit of its ‘responsibility to protect’. No doubt, too, setting up an independent and impartial merits-review of
major administrative decisions taken by the Secretariat would make a substantial contribution to improving the accountability of officials and the procedural and ethical foundations upon which they base their decisions. 9. Each of the latter suggestions has had as its object the amelioration of
political hostilities and divisions in order to generate more considered deliberation on matters of international concern. However meritorious they may be, they are unlikely still to make a significant difference to the UN’s operations while the competing factions inhabiting and derailing its deliberative processes remain untouched and unaddressed. As the analysis in Chapter 9 demonstrated amply, the world organization may be approaching the point of losing the common currency of its deliberations, that is, the language of universality and multilateralism on the basis of which it was founded. There are three sets of circumstances in which such an outcome might be avoided.
