ABSTRACT
IGAD is the successor organization to the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), created in 1986 by six drought-stricken East African countries (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda)1 with a narrow mandate around the issues of drought and desertification. With the active encouragement of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), IGADD was created in order to improve the regional response to natural disasters.2
In the mid-1990s the founding members of IGADD decided to revitalize and transform the organization into a fully fledged regional political, economic, development, trade, and security entity similar to ECOWAS and SADC (founded in 1975 and 1992 respectively). One of the principal motivations for the revitalization of IGADD was the existence of many organizational and structural problems that made the implementation of its goals and principles ineffective. To tackle these problems IGADD leaders met in April 1995 and resolved to revitalize the authority and expand its areas of regional cooperation. In March 1996 at the Second Extraordinary Summit in Nairobi they approved and adopted an Agreement Establishing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. In April 1996 on the recommendation of the Summit of the Heads of State and Government, the IGAD Council of Ministers identified three priority areas of cooperation: conflict prevention, management and resolution, and humanitarian affairs; infrastructure development (transport and communications); and food security and environment protection. The initial enthusiasm soon encountered various obstacles and the
leaders quickly realized that the efficiency of IGAD is hampered by several factors. This was even acknowledged by IGAD’s former executive secretary, Attalla Hamad Bashir (2000-8), who has noted that the region is idiosyncratic as first, it often suffers from natural calamities (floods, famine, water shortages, droughts), second, IGAD countries
are devastated by civil wars and political instability, third, they are the poorest countries in the world, finally, the illiteracy rate reaches 80 percent.3 Indeed, the prevalence of identity politics and processes or state formation and disintegration are identified as common structural features of conflict in the region.4 In addition to this problematic scenario, two of its key member states, Ethiopia and Eritrea, have been involved in a deadly conflict from 1998 to 2000, and have been engaged in a process of mutual accusations ever since that has unquestionably affected the work of the organization. However, it seems more pertinent to evaluate IGAD not by juxta-
posing its initial objectives with its accomplishments, but rather by recognizing that the organization has already accomplished a great deal in a context that is adverse and detrimental. Some authors have nonetheless contended that “IGAD has not been successful in ending current conflicts and bringing stability to the region. IGAD’s inability to foster peace and security cooperation among the countries in the Horn stems fundamentally from the persisting suspicions, geographical rivalries, and ideological differences among its members.”5 It could be argued however that the name change from IGADD to IGAD was not merely cosmetic and has had a bearing on the ability of the Djibouti-based secretariat to promote peace and security more directly. And in this light, IGAD has performed well in the areas of peace and security, namely in Sudan and Somalia-where it has been involved with mediation efforts since the early 1990s. Given the socio-economic disparities, societal heterogeneities, and
geographical boundaries, it has always been difficult to create a stable regional security identity in the IGAD region. Culturally and historically speaking, various fault lines, which have successfully been politicized in the course of the last century, criss-cross the arena. One is the line between Arabic and Black Africa linked with lines between Muslim and Christian culture, or the line between peasant culture and nomadic pastoralism.6 There are other factors that curtail regional integration, namely the absence of a leading power (like South Africa in SADC or Nigeria in ECOWAS), heavily differing forms of national government and types of state constitution, diverging domestic policies, and self-centered nationalist leaders who may minimize efforts toward integration and cooperation.7 But violent conflict constitutes perhaps the single greatest barrier to economic and social development in the IGAD region. The Horn of Africa has been embroiled in endless wars for more than 40 years and represents one of the most complex regional peace and security clusters8 in the world. Interactions between the states of the region support and sustain the conflicts within the state of
the region in a systematic way.9 Despite this background, and with very low resources, IGAD has been able to set up an effective security agenda, most notably in conflict prevention and peacemaking.
