ABSTRACT
It is appropriate to conclude the narrative which I have sketched in this book by looking at Dubai’s place in the world or, more tellingly, how Dubai sees itself globally. This issue came to the fore in 2006 during what has become known as the Dubai Port episode. Dubai Port had acquired British port operator P&O which managed numerous ports worldwide including several in the US. A political upheaval ensued – mostly centred on Arabs and Moslems controlling ports of entry which might lead to terrorists entering unencumbered. Because of this controversy Dubai Port decided to forsake its control of US ports but retained the remainder of P&O’s ‘empire’. This incident exposed two signifi cant points. First, from a local perspective, the notion that Dubai, because of its global integration, could somehow, miraculously, divorce itself from its regional (i.e. Arab/Moslem) context and secondly – and this is a critical point – that its global ambitions had began to attract the attention of lawmakers and decision-makers outside the region, who until then had viewed Dubai mostly as an amusing sideshow, not needing to be taken seriously. Clearly, this is not merely an Arabian fairytale – but a serious developmental model. Which takes us to the Friedman quote above.
