The Consequences of the Battle

Whether Kursk was a decisive battle or not depends on what is implied by ‘decisive’. Certain basic facts can sometimes demonstrate that a battle produced losses or a situation from which one side could not recover. This can hardly apply to Kursk, since neither German nor Soviet casualties or equipment losses were particularly high. During Zitadelle German manpower losses amounted to 56,827 men killed, wounded or missing. ¹ This can be compared with the overall combat losses for Germany on the eastern front during 1943, amounting to 1,601,454 men. ² Thus, casualties suffered during Zitadelle constituted only about 3 per cent of the total for 1943. Similarly, Soviet casualties suffered during Zitadelle amounted to 177,847 men, ³ which is only 2.3 per cent of the 7,857,503 casualties suffered during 1943 by the Red Army. ⁴ Evidently, manpower losses in Zitadelle were quite small for both powers, and cannot be seen as decisive, at least not in the context of the struggle on the eastern front. For the Germans, comparison can also be made with the 89,480 replacements that arrived on the eastern front during July 1943, ⁵ which were more than sufficient to cover the losses suffered during Zitadelle, though not losses sustained elsewhere on the same front. If we only take into account the reserves moved forward by the Red Army during Operation Zitadelle we find that the Red Army in fact increased its strength in the Kursk salient; 295,000 soldiers from Stavka reserves moved into the Kursk Bulge, though not all of them were fully committed to battle. ⁶ Thus the Red Army had larger forces in the front line after the German offensive than before in terms of manpower. A further 363,000 soldiers from the Stavka reserves moved forward to assist the offensive against Orel and Belgorod- Kharkov. ⁷