ABSTRACT
This study assesses the impact of institutionally induced incentives that legislators face under different circumstances. The focus of this study is on an external institution that moulds the internal makeup of the legislature and influences the relationship between parliamentary members and leaders, that is, the electoral system, both inter- and intra-party. More specifically, can a reform of the electoral system, aimed at targets unassociated with the roles of parliamentary members and leaders, have an impact on their relationship? How pervasive can this impact be? The empirical evidence in this study focuses on the case of Israel, where in the early 1990s, several significant electoral reforms were enacted that had a dramatic impact on the dynamics of Israeli politics in general, and on the relationship between parliamentary members and leaders in particular. These simultaneous reforms also drastically reshaped the interaction between the executive and the legislative branches, between the legislators and the voters, and between the parties and the voters.
