Introduction

With ‘violence’ as a dominant concept in his politics, 9/11 revived interest in Jean-Paul Sartre’s work, renewing concerns over his justifi cations for the use of violence and the ‘terrorist’ nature of his writings. In particular, the post-9/11 New Orleans discussion raised an important question: how can violence ever be justifi ed on behalf of a better and more just society without disparaging humanity, and also be the path to humanity?1 Yet, there is another equally signifi cant side to the debate: why is violence unjustifi ed when it can put an end to a situation that disparages humanity? This points us to the two broad ways of approaching the relationship between ethics and violence. The fi rst is to examine the justifi cation of violence in terms of the positive consequences it may bring as a better alternative to nonviolence. The second is to examine the ways in which violence is acceptable according to objective circumstances, the aims and consequences of the project, and the choice of methods. The second approach considers violence as not morally justifi ed since it does not bring any positive moral consequences but morally excusable under certain conditions perhaps resulting in consequences that observe certain moral boundaries.