ABSTRACT
Background Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, there were ten confirmed attacks of inhalational anthrax within the United States. The European Community was also confronted by a number of anthrax-related hoaxes, as well as the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, and views that bioterrorism was a threat to all states and nations.1 Hence, biopreparedness should be at the forefront of every nation’s consciousness, and perceived as a global problem that does not respect geographic, political, economic, or cultural boundaries. Biopreparedness includes preparedness, response, and recovery of a number of related functions and disciplines from a biological incident (man-made or natural). The category of man-made attacks includes deliberate (i.e., criminal) and accidental. Furthermore, biopreparedness requires a response strategy semiautonomous from the process of determination of motivation and intent of the attack(s), and assumes an “all-hazards” response philosophy. This fundamental principle was repeatedly espoused by former U.S. Surgeon General Richard Carmona, and was closely coupled to the belief that saving and protecting human life and property must take priority over law enforcement activities such as evidence preservation and collection, forensics analysis, and identification of the implicated biological agent(s) involved. This conflicts with the customary FBI approach. Effective biopreparedness necessitates an integrated, systematic approach to preparedness and response, including a number of critical sectors that do not normally function together. These sectors include: public health (human, animal,
and plant); civil defense, emergency management, and law enforcement; biosecurity of bio-safety-level (BSL) facilities; biotechnology private sector; academic and federal research facilities; national biological manufacturing infrastructure; military sector; communications sector; cyber infrastructure; transportation infrastructure; and food and agricultural sectors.2 Given the wide spectrum of roles and missions of the Reserve Forces and, in particular, the National Guard (NG), they may assist communities in a number of roles in the biopreparedness environment. The NG’s innate capabilities are strengthened by its dual federal and state roles and familiarization with community organizations and the associated political and cultural landscapes. In the context of biopreparedness and response to other unconventional threats (such as chemical, nuclear, radiological, and cyber), emerging homeland security support roles and missions performed by Department of Defense (DOD) and led by other federal, state, or local agencies are referred to as “defense support of civil authorities,”3 and have taken on greater importance in the post-9/11 era. The NG may be requested to support a wide spectrum of domestic events in either a federal or state capacity, referring to relevant chain of command and primary funding source. When funded primarily by the federal government or state government, the NG performs its duties under the command of the President or Governor, respectively. In the context of a large-scale bioterrorism event, it is anticipated that the NG will be federalized in an effort to enhance surge capacity needed for an effective response. In its federal capacity, the NG can support regional-and national-scale attacks, thus more effectively augmenting state and local capacity. The problematic side of this duality of roles and missions coin is the fact that many NG members work in their communities as part of the emergency-response network, and their mobilization would impact capacity at the state and local level, while enhancing capacity elsewhere. Hence, in recognition of this dilemma, states have proactively implemented interstate agreements (Compacts) that identify assets and resources under each respective state’s control to be shared during a disaster.
