Conclusion

This book has reviewed many aspects of the current and evolving biosecurity threat horizon. Collectively, the chapters have covered many relevant areas in biosecurity. The result is comprehensive, but not necessarily encyclopedic. While we have attempted to be complete, some subjects could not be comprehensively explored, and others have undoubtedly been omitted. The topics covered are complex, and at times contentious. For example, definitions of many terms, such as “preparedness,” “terrorism,” “all-hazards,” and “first responder” are often ambiguous, being defined differently by many groups. Thus we have tried, when possible, to avoid them. Even the CDC categorization of biothreat agents into their specific A, B, and C categories may be very misleading as the technology to weaponize advances (which we in the scientific, medical, policy, and emergency response communities understand poorly). These ideas are viewed through a Western “in the box” way of thinking. Our adversaries think in very different ways and the cultural understanding of these differences is essential. A key goal of this book is to emphasize the need for global resilience and cooperation in preparedness, prevention, response and intelligence. Intelligence, for example, has to be co-produced and easily shared among the parties that need it when making decisions to protect our operations during all phases: pre-, trans-, and post-event. Intelligence for biosecurity then becomes a tool for better anticipating and understanding the dynamics of the threat and response spectrum. In addition to FININT, SIGINT, and HUMINT, different types of intelligence, such as threat, criminal, counterproliferation, and epidemiological intelligence are needed to craft a situational understanding of global biosecurity. Crafting responses to large-scale bioevents requires tools and approaches that help all decision makers navigate uncertainty. Intelligence is one essential tool for helping physicians, all responders, and government officials manage the potential consequences of bioterrorism, pandemics, and other crises. While intelligence is not a perfect science, it is an essential integrating component of an effective global security regime. Good intelligence informs decision making, enables early warning of disease and conflict, and provides situational understanding to formulate a viable response. But integrating intelligence networks will require a shift from a limited

“need to know” approach to a broad “need to share” approach. Cooperation, coproduction, and collaboration among and across spatial and disciplinary divides are therefore essential elements of the biosecurity equation. The role of technology – both information and biotechnology – cannot be overstated. New product development is rapidly proliferating both geographically and technologically. This includes Professor Scott Layne’s high throughput laboratory to analyze thousands of specimens per day being developed at Los Alamos Labs and UCLA, syndromic surveillance programs initially developed in NYC, and bioengineering, genomics, and proteomics being developed at universities and companies all over the world. In addition, there are links between cybersecurity and biosecurity, nanotechnology diagnostics and sensors. Advanced systems for detection and deployment of biological agents, and political and health-giving initiatives are vitally important. This includes areas such as weaponization and dissemination, chimera agents, genetically engineered agents, and binary agents, not to mention the mass production of agents as done by Biopreparat in Russia. Biothreat agents “grown in the basement” can cause transient panic and limited physical damage, but properly disseminated and weaponized agents can cause widespread destruction and fear. This difference in impact, medically and psychologically, is crucial in any preparedness effort. Sustaining global security also requires resilient and highly adaptive mechanisms for dealing with threats. We all agree that bioterrorism events have profound local consequences, and much of the effort needed to respond to and contain an outbreak or attack lies with local agencies, local relationships, local memorandums of understanding (MOU), and local resources. But responses during pandemics need to be global. In other words we need to act locally but think globally. Preparedness by all entities – local, regional, state, national, and supranational – is essential to managing the wide range of potential biological, health, and economic threats and their consequences. Furthermore, government preparedness must be done in conjunction with such non-government entities as businesses, non-profits, and community groups like Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT). As a result, effective and adaptive preparedness and response will require coordinated efforts that cut across organizational, disciplinary, and jurisdictional boundaries. Preparedness, in our view, will need to address a broad spectrum of health and human security issues. We have stressed that the application of biosecurity must be expanded to include events that result from natural or intentional outbreaks of diseases, climate change, as well as the health and humanitarian consequences of conflict disasters and acts of terrorism. Responses based on these preparedness efforts will need to be integrated among a range of diverse and often separated disciplines. They must deftly synchronize a range of capabilities (political, military, medical, epidemiological, diplomatic, security, law enforcement, and intelligence) on a potentially continental or even global scale.