ABSTRACT
As an active former participant in charge of production, I will provide a few thoughts on the old U.S. Offensive Biological Warfare Program that President Nixon disestablished in 1969.1 Much of the specifics of what I have to say is classified for obvious reasons, so I will only give the broader perspective. What follows are the reflections of an old bioweaponeer who has over 56 years of experience in the rather unique and arcane field of bioweaponization. I joined the Offensive Program in 1951, having come from industry as a microbiologist concerned with antibiotic research. I considered myself a “hot shot” investigator who would give no more than two years of government service at Camp Dietrick, Maryland. Many years later, I continued to be inti mately involved with biological warfare, and its derivative, bioterrorism. How wrong I was in estimating time associated with biological weapons. From 1943, the beginning of the Offensive Program, until its termination in 1969 the feasibility of biological warfare was firmly established by large-scale field tests.2 Industrial-grade biological agents, purified, concentrated, and stabi lized, were disseminated from realistic munitions and sophisticated delivery systems into open-air targets. Under appropriate meteorological environments, the resulting aerosols were shown to be predictive to kill experimental animals over a very wide range of 10,000 square miles and larger. These summary results were achieved by successful studies implemented by people from many disci plines: physicians, microbiologists, biochemists, physicists, mathematicians, and many types of engineers. I was privileged to be part of these exciting times. In the early years, progress was slow because of the inability to generate con sistently homogeneous, small-particle infectious aerosols. The solution to this problem then led to demonstrating the relations between particle size and the number of organisms required to cause infection. The most efficient aerosol is composed of agent particles that fall within the 1-5 micron range. Human studies were an outgrowth of animal model data of particle size. Young men from the Seventh Day Adventist Church, not wanting to train with rifles but still patriotic, volunteered to join the army and became guinea pigs.3 These volun teers were exposed to infectious aerosols of 1-5 microns. For the first time in medical history, precise estimates of the number of organisms necessary to cause human infection was obtained. For example, it required only 1-10 Coxiella
burnetti (the agent of Q fever) to cause a respiratory infection, only 10-50 cells of the Schu 4 strain of tularemia, and 0.025 micrograms of Staphylococcal enter otoxin B.4 All volunteers recovered from their infections and showed no ill effects of the disease during 50 years of follow-up. The behavior of primary and secondary aerosols was established. It is difficult today to construct or implement proper decontamination procedures in the absence of an understanding of these aerosols. The primary aerosol, composed of 1-5 microns, behaves like a gas, does not leave a residue as it passes over an area and causes an infection, and yet is immune to our five senses. One of the most important advances in the old program was an ability to grow fastidious organisms to high concentration, to stabilize these fragile organisms to a variety of stresses, and to remove free water by any of several drying proce dures. The resulting powder, highly concentrated, free-flowing, electrostatic-free and rather hydrophobic in nature, could be disseminated with a high degree of efficiency. These highly effective powders, for the most part, achieved the proper particle size without the need for milling or at a low level of energy for milling. Biological agents, except for anthrax, do not survive milling very well. Safety was of paramount importance during the U.S. Offensive Program. Crude vaccines were developed for “at risk” workers. Hood systems were devised which permitted people to work with large amounts of either liquid or dry powders. Moreover, a variety of laboratory techniques were developed that protected individual scientists and technicians. As important, engineering prin ciples were developed which paved the way for modern BS-3 and BS-4 level laboratory construction.5 Engineering safety concepts were lacking in the con struction of the first production plant. This plant, constructed in 1944 in Vego County, Indiana, came on stream in 1945, the year World War II ended. There was no need for this huge plant that contained 12 20,000-gallon fermenters, all dedicated to anthrax production. Even if World War II had not ended, it was doubtful if the plant could produce anthrax since the plant leaked like a sieve, as observed during the fermentation of spores from Bacillus globigii (a harmless simulant for anthrax). The lab lacked the necessary safety constraints and was never used. A second construction plant was constructed at Pine Bluff Arsenal in 1953-1954.6 Engineering safety principles were much better incorporated into this plant. It operated without a single infection from 1954 to 1969. The plant was our pride and joy. It contained ten 3,600-gallon fermenters, which was only 15 percent of the size available in the Vego plant. Several years later, an eggvirology production capability as well as a freeze-drying facility was added to the production complex. When Dr. Ken Alibek, Deputy Director of the Soviet offensive bioweapons program Biopreparat, defected from the Soviet Union in 1992, I had the pleasure of debriefing him at the request of the CIA. During our “offensive” days we often speculated what the Soviets were doing in their program and now, years later, we received first-hand information regarding the magnitude of their program. To illustrate, our production facility could produce almost one metric
ton of freeze-dried anthrax per year. The Soviet Union had the potential of pro ducing 4,500 metric tons of dried anthrax per year. The quality of the products between countries was essentially the same. The difference in volume produc tion of all agents favored the Soviets. They had five large production plants within Biopreparat, and perhaps more production facilities under the top secret control of the KGB and the military. Dr. Alibek eventually published Biohazard, a book that went into great detail about the Soviet program.7 From 1943 through the 1950s the research and development program suffered because using agencies did not develop doctrine and target requirements for our agents. The using agency should have been more specific with respect to what was required of the agent, the munition, and the method of delivery. As a result, Fort Dietrik investigators were non focused and spent a great deal of time dis cussing the importance of agent and munition properties but never arriving at specific conclusions. For example, was agent concentration or biological decay more important? At what point of storage was the product no longer effective? Dr. James L. Roberts, Director of Development at Fort Dietrik, eliminated an area of uncertainty by introducing a very simple concept in 1957. He postulated that Calder’s Mathematical Models could be used to calculate the number of infectious doses required on a target to meet objectives; that is, deduce the agent properties and munition properties that had to be available in order to achieve the number of infectious doses required on the target. Targets were classified as to their objective and this produced five types of targets. Existing agents and munitions were used to attack these five targets, as appropriate. Unfortunately this approach indicated that few agents and munitions, as they existed, possessed the necessary biological or physical characteristics to meet target requirements. Product development of freeze-dried Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE) virus was the first program to follow the principles of the “Roberts Concept.” It was highly successful and was implemented through pilot plant and production programs.8 As I reach the end of a very long and interesting career, one thing greatly dis turbs me. Young, dedicated research scientists, armed with DNA technology plus other major advances, tend to ignore the findings of our “old program.” Federal policy workers tend to ignore our old program. Thirty-eight years ago we established the principles of biological warfare, and basic principles do not change easily. Our professional and political leaders of today would commit a gross oversight to regard the old program as something conducted during the Dark Ages. The major offensive reports are still available but classified, and should be read to prevent the “rediscovery of the wheel.”
