ABSTRACT

Early next day (28th) came the order for a general withdrawal from Central Norway (A.T. 0339) :—‘ I t has been decided to re-embark the force landed at Namsos and Aandalsnes areas as soon as possible. . . . \ The principal cause of the giving up of these southern expeditions was the German strength in the air. This allowed them to send an army to Norway by sea, unhindered except within the limited capacity of submarines and mining. Once established in Norway, their working with an adequate air force gave German soldiers further advantages. Aircraft transported small parties of troops and quantities of supplies, they directed the fire of artillery, and especially they destroyed the Allies' bases almost at leisure, interrupted only by a few machines working from carriers or flying occasionally the long distance from the British Isles, and by a few short-range guns on shore backed by the long-range fire of one or two sloops, destroyers, or anti-aircraft ships. The immediate occasion of the retreat seems to have been this gradual destruction of the bases, on which the troops depended for almost every need, whether of victuals, fuel or ammunition ; but so long as the Germans retained command of the sea in the Skagerrak and were thus able to reinforce their troops in Southern Norway at will, the final decision in Central Norway could scarcely be in doubt. ‘ I t is impossible ', said the First Lord of the Admiralty, when explaining to Sir Charles Forbes the decision to withdraw from Aandalsnes, ‘ for 3000 or 4000 men without artillery or air superiority to withstand advance of 70,000 or 80,000 thoroughly equipped Germans '. At the same time he said, ‘ Feel sure you must be very proud of the way your A.A. craft and, above all, the Fleet Air Arm are comporting themselves \ 1

41. Plan of the evacuation [P la n 11 The first plan was to bring off the troops of both expeditions at the same time.