ABSTRACT
An irrealist about fiction claims that there are no robust fictional characters; or, at the least, that we have no need to suppose that there are in order to explain fiction. An irrealist about intentionality extends this position to all cases of “aboutness”. The central notion is thinking about. I can think about Pegasus (a fictional or mythological example) or about a cure for cancer or the brilliant book I never wrote (nonfictional examples). Ponce de León’s search for the fountain of youth was “about” the fountain of youth. We may not want to say that this is an example of fiction, but much the same issues are at stake: can there be a search for the fountain of youth even if there is no such thing or no such fountain? Can there be a search for Tralfamadore, even though there is no such planet? If every search needs an object, then the objects of some searches will have to be what I call exotic: nonexistent, or nonactual, or nonconcrete (else we will be committed to the falsehood that there is an existent, actual and concrete fountain of youth). Other examples
of intentionality are very diverse and widespread. I may need help, even if there is none to be had, may worship Zeus, even if there is no such god, may admire Phaeton, even if he never existed, may fear ghosts, even if there are none; and so on. Irrealists say that we do not need to recognize exotic objects as the objects of such states: in the use of “objects” which matters to ontology, they are states without objects.
