ABSTRACT
Th e relationship between the president and the parties has never been easy, though its dynamics have varied over the course of American political history. Th e architects of the Constitution established a nonpartisan president who, with the support of the judiciary and Senate, was intended to play the leading institutional role in checking and controlling “the violence of faction” that the framers feared would rend the fabric of representative government. Even aft er the presidency became a more partisan offi ce, its authority continued to depend on an ability to remain independent of party politics, especially during national emergencies such as the Civil War and the Spanish-American War (Ketcham 1984). Indeed, the institutional imperatives of the executive appear at fi rst glance to be inherently at odds with the character of political parties. Party organization seems better suited to legislative bodies, which have a collective action problem, than to an executive dedicated to vigorous and expeditious administration. Presidents can best display their personal qualities “above party,” Wilson Carey McWilliams observed. By contrast, “Congress cannot be eff ective, let alone powerful, without the institution of party…. A legislature can rival the executive’s claim to public confi dence only to the extent that it is accountable, which presumes a principle of collective responsibility” (McWilliams 1989, 35, emphasis in original).
