ABSTRACT
In the mid-1980s, Indonesia’s President Suharto and his militarydominated ‘New Order’ (Orde Baru) regime were at the height of their power. Since the transfer of power in 1966 from the previous regime, the so-called ‘Old Order’ (Orde Lama) under Indonesia’s first president Sukarno, the country had undergone unprecedented economic development, which had raised the standards of living for the vast majority of Indonesia’s population, an achievement which formed the basis for the regime’s and the president’s main claim to legitimacy. Politically, the New Order reigned supreme, having put much effort into repressing or sidelining potential challenges to the political status quo. All major surviving social and political organisations had been co-opted and forced to denounce their ideological roots and identities, and most organisations had been forced to elect compliant leaders who depended on the government for their political careers and economic prospects. By the mid-1980s, thus, Indonesia was left with little open opposition and no serious political threats to the power structure of the regime. The government could even argue with some credibility that its authoritarian rule reflected a specific national political culture modelled on the precolonial Javanese kingdoms or traditional indigenous village organisation.
