Logistics Doctrine and the Impact of War

Since it could be argued the Royal Air Force (RAF) has never had a formal logistics doctrine, any discussion on the subject seems destined to be brief. On the other hand, logistics is so fundamental to the effective delivery of air power that it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate out those many elements of RAF doctrine that bear directly on logistic issues. ¹ It is perhaps ironic that this catholic view has its echoes in Hugh Trenchard’s structure for the post-war RAF that envisaged an officer cadre – the General Duties (GD) Branch – that would exercise responsibility for all those activities bearing directly on the efficient and effective running of an air force, including maintenance, signals, armament and supply. ² The increasing difficulties faced in sustaining this policy through the inter-war years offers some insight into how organizational arrangements may not only provide a physical realization of doctrine but also the subsequent battleground in any effort to achieve change. It is no exaggeration to claim that the debate over the introduction of a technical branch, which became increasingly vocal from 1934 onwards, struck at the heart of Trenchard’s vision for the service – and was seen as such by many of the protagonists.