ABSTRACT
The mens rea for the s 47 offence is the same as for assault or battery. The prosecution must prove that the D intentionally put the V in fear or apprehension of unlawful violence, or intentionally used unlawful force on the V, or was subjectively reckless as to either of these consequences to his behaviour. There is no need to prove any state of mind on the part of the D as regards the causing of actual bodily harm. This was the central issue in Parmenter.80 The D’s baby son was injured as a result of the D’s rough handling. He was charged under s 20 of the OAPA,81 with maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm. He admitted causing the injuries, but claimed they were unintentional, as he did not realise the danger, having no previous experience of dealing with young babies. The judge gave a direction that indicated to the jury that they could convict under s 20 if they felt the D should have foreseen the risk of injury to the baby (that is, an objective test). The Court of Appeal held that this was a misdirection in relation to s 20, as the test was the subjective one of whether the D himself realised the risks of some injury to the V. Turning to s 47, the court followed its earlier decision in Spratt,82 which suggested that foresight of the risk of harm following from an assault was a necessary ingredient of the offence. A different view, however, had been taken by the Court of Appeal in Savage,83 which had held that no element of intention or recklessness was required as the actual bodily harm. It was enough that an assault was as a matter of fact followed by such harm. The House of Lords, which considered the appeals in Savage and Parmenter together, therefore had to decide between conflicting views of the Court of Appeal on this issue. The House of Lords felt that the approach taken in Spratt and Parmenter overlooked the effect of the decision in Roberts.84 The Court of Appeal in that case had held that there was no need for the prosecution to prove that the D foresaw that the V might jump from his car as a result of his assault in order for the D to be convicted under s 47. Of course, a totally unforeseeable reaction might break the chain of causation between the assault and the harm (so that the assault no longer ‘occasioned’ the harm), but otherwise, once an assault was proved from which actual bodily harm resulted then the offence was made out. Thus, the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Savage was to be preferred to that in Spratt or Parmenter. The prosecution is not obliged to prove that the D intended to cause the V some harm, or was reckless as to whether such harm would be caused, in order to obtain a conviction under s 47.
