ABSTRACT
This chapter covers a vast, complex range of legislation aimed at curbing discrimination and promoting equality. But one of its key themes will be that the formal equality model on which most of this legislation is based is deeply fl awed and may be standing in the way of achieving equality of outcome. Forty years ago, in the UK, protection from discrimination was only offered under the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. Disability as a protected ground was included over ten years ago, and subsequently the grounds on which discrimination is prohibited have greatly increased: new protected grounds were added, including sexual orientation, age, religion and belief. The full list of protected grounds now includes: race, nationality, national origins, colour, gender, disability, gender reassignment, marital status, pregnancy, sexual orientation, age, religion and belief. So a range of statutes and regulations have been introduced, and amended, since 1975 when the Sex Discrimination Act was introduced, providing comprehensive protection from discrimination for the fi rst time in UK law. In contrast to other areas of civil liberties and human rights considered in this book,
such as free speech, the common law had completely failed to provide protection in this area. The judicial culture that lay behind the failure of the common law to create tortious protection from discrimination is now, it is argued, evident in the strong judicial stance taken against affi rmative action.2
