ABSTRACT
This chapter fulfils two functions. Its main purpose is to remind the reader of the different approach towards human rights within the European Convention on Human Rights, compared with the traditional liberty-based approach English advocates have been used to. It highlights the different language and principles inherent in Convention jurisprudence and the consequential adjustments that have to be made to the structure of decisionmaking in courts and tribunals since the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998. First, however, we outline some of the early judicial comments regarding the Act and the Convention that have emerged during the first year of its operation. This provides an insight into how amenable the courts will be to creative use of the new legislation and, just as important, assists advocates to ascertain the limits of what is considered reasonable use of Convention rights arguments. As with all new laws touching on fundamental relationships such as that between the citizen and the state, and particularly with the Human Rights Act, it is important to grasp the developing judicial consciousness in respect of it. This enables the advocate to make the difficult choices about which arguments are worthwhile running and which should be left in the seminar room.
