ABSTRACT
In considering the topic of jurisdiction it was posited that state A would prima facie enjoy jurisdiction within its own territory in criminal and civil matters by virtue of its sovereignty. Such jurisdiction would in principle embrace its entire territory. It was noted elsewhere that in customary international law each state was in principle equal and none superior to another. Thus, simply at the theoretical level it was difficult to contemplate a situation in which the courts of state A could sit in judgment over a ruler of state B in respect of sovereign acts committed within his own territory. The concept of immunity from jurisdiction has from the outset been closely linked with the related concept of the sovereign equality of states. Aside from the principle that par in parem non habet imperium a number of justifications were advanced. Some argued that the immunity was linked to questions of comity while others argued that if a ruler of state B entered the territory of state A then the immunity arose by implied grant. Neither of these explanations was completely satisfactory but it was recognised in the 18th century that in some circumstances a foreign head of state, a diplomatic representative or a public ship might enjoy a certain immunity from jurisdiction. Such an immunity might take the form of immunity from the process of the court or it might concern the property belonging to a foreign state.2
