ABSTRACT
Another possible way of viewing the facts in Miller v Jackson is to say, following Cumming-Bruce LJ in particular, that the purchasers of the house were estopped from claiming a remedy for nuisance because they appreciated, or ought to have appreciated, at the time of buying the house that it was situated close to a cricket ground. Now estoppel was not specifically raised as such in the case, but Cumming-Bruce LJ, as we have just seen, hints at facts which go some way in suggesting that the plaintiffs acquiesced, if not consented, to the continuing of the cricket. In situations where such acquiescence or consent is proved, the Court of Chancery may well be prepared to intervene with its ‘remedy’ of estoppel. Whether estoppel deserves to be treated as an independent equitable remedy is open to doubt. In truth, it is an equitable doctrine used to motivate certain equitable remedies such as injunction and rectification. Nevertheless, it is an area of Chancery relief that has attracted its own body of case law and is now of such practical importance that it needs to be distinguished from those substantive areas of law of obligations where it often finds expression.
