the wishes of the Government expressed in the form of legislation, or the extent to which it can interfere with the pursuit of those wishes. Until now it has been a commonplace of political thought that although the United Kingdom might not have a written constitution its unwritten constitution was nonetheless based on fundamental principles. Amongst these principles were the sovereignty of Parliament and the Rule of Law. The centrality within the United Kingdom constitution of the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty has traditionally meant that Parliament can make such law as it determines, but the validity of such an interpretation has been questioned by some. The justifications for such challenges to absolute Parliamentary sovereignty are based on the United Kingdom's membership of both the European Union and the Council of Europe with the implications of higher authorities than Parliament, in the former's legislation and the latter's endorsement of inalienable individual rights. As for the Rule of Law, although it is a notoriously amorphous concept, it has provided the courts with scope for challenging the actions of the executive and, indeed, to a more limited degree, the legislature. The mechanism through which the courts have previously exercised their burgeoning constitutional and, by definition, political role is judicial review by means of which they have asserted the right to subject the actions and operations of the executive to the gaze and control of the law in such a way as to prevent the executive from abusing its power. However, such power has been greatly extended by the enactment of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998. The Act only came into effect in October 2000 so the question remains as to how the courts will use the powers given to them under that Act. The remaining articles in this chapter will consider the wider political context within which the judiciary operate as well as focusing on the Rule of Law and the HRA 1998. In an article 'Law and democracy', published in the Spring 1995 edition of Public Law, Sir John Laws, Justice of the High Court, Queen's Bench Division, considered the appropriate role of judges within the constitution from the perspective of the judge (footnotes omitted).

doi:10.4324/9781843143451-26

Chapter

the wishes of the Government expressed in the form of legislation, or the extent to which it can interfere with the pursuit of those wishes. Until now it has been a commonplace of political thought that although the United Kingdom might not have a written constitution its unwritten constitution was nonetheless based on fundamental principles. Amongst these principles were the sovereignty of Parliament and the Rule of Law. The centrality within the United Kingdom constitution of the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty has traditionally meant that Parliament can make such law as it determines, but the validity of such an interpretation has been questioned by some. The justifications for such challenges to absolute Parliamentary sovereignty are based on the United Kingdom's membership of both the European Union and the Council of Europe with the implications of higher authorities than Parliament, in the former's legislation and the latter's endorsement of inalienable individual rights. As for the Rule of Law, although it is a notoriously amorphous concept, it has provided the courts with scope for challenging the actions of the executive and, indeed, to a more limited degree, the legislature. The mechanism through which the courts have previously exercised their burgeoning constitutional and, by definition, political role is judicial review by means of which they have asserted the right to subject the actions and operations of the executive to the gaze and control of the law in such a way as to prevent the executive from abusing its power. However, such power has been greatly extended by the enactment of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998. The Act only came into effect in October 2000 so the question remains as to how the courts will use the powers given to them under that Act. The remaining articles in this chapter will consider the wider political context within which the judiciary operate as well as focusing on the Rule of Law and the HRA 1998. In an article 'Law and democracy', published in the Spring 1995 edition of Public Law, Sir John Laws, Justice of the High Court, Queen's Bench Division, considered the appropriate role of judges within the constitution from the perspective of the judge (footnotes omitted).

Chapter

the wishes of the Government expressed in the form of legislation, or the extent to which it can interfere with the pursuit of those wishes. Until now it has been a commonplace of political thought that although the United Kingdom might not have a written constitution its unwritten constitution was nonetheless based on fundamental principles. Amongst these principles were the sovereignty of Parliament and the Rule of Law. The centrality within the United Kingdom constitution of the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty has traditionally meant that Parliament can make such law as it determines, but the validity of such an interpretation has been questioned by some. The justifications for such challenges to absolute Parliamentary sovereignty are based on the United Kingdom's membership of both the European Union and the Council of Europe with the implications of higher authorities than Parliament, in the former's legislation and the latter's endorsement of inalienable individual rights. As for the Rule of Law, although it is a notoriously amorphous concept, it has provided the courts with scope for challenging the actions of the executive and, indeed, to a more limited degree, the legislature. The mechanism through which the courts have previously exercised their burgeoning constitutional and, by definition, political role is judicial review by means of which they have asserted the right to subject the actions and operations of the executive to the gaze and control of the law in such a way as to prevent the executive from abusing its power. However, such power has been greatly extended by the enactment of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998. The Act only came into effect in October 2000 so the question remains as to how the courts will use the powers given to them under that Act. The remaining articles in this chapter will consider the wider political context within which the judiciary operate as well as focusing on the Rule of Law and the HRA 1998. In an article 'Law and democracy', published in the Spring 1995 edition of Public Law, Sir John Laws, Justice of the High Court, Queen's Bench Division, considered the appropriate role of judges within the constitution from the perspective of the judge (footnotes omitted).

DOI link for the wishes of the Government expressed in the form of legislation, or the extent to which it can interfere with the pursuit of those wishes. Until now it has been a commonplace of political thought that although the United Kingdom might not have a written constitution its unwritten constitution was nonetheless based on fundamental principles. Amongst these principles were the sovereignty of Parliament and the Rule of Law. The centrality within the United Kingdom constitution of the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty has traditionally meant that Parliament can make such law as it determines, but the validity of such an interpretation has been questioned by some. The justifications for such challenges to absolute Parliamentary sovereignty are based on the United Kingdom's membership of both the European Union and the Council of Europe with the implications of higher authorities than Parliament, in the former's legislation and the latter's endorsement of inalienable individual rights. As for the Rule of Law, although it is a notoriously amorphous concept, it has provided the courts with scope for challenging the actions of the executive and, indeed, to a more limited degree, the legislature. The mechanism through which the courts have previously exercised their burgeoning constitutional and, by definition, political role is judicial review by means of which they have asserted the right to subject the actions and operations of the executive to the gaze and control of the law in such a way as to prevent the executive from abusing its power. However, such power has been greatly extended by the enactment of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998. The Act only came into effect in October 2000 so the question remains as to how the courts will use the powers given to them under that Act. The remaining articles in this chapter will consider the wider political context within which the judiciary operate as well as focusing on the Rule of Law and the HRA 1998. In an article 'Law and democracy', published in the Spring 1995 edition of Public Law, Sir John Laws, Justice of the High Court, Queen's Bench Division, considered the appropriate role of judges within the constitution from the perspective of the judge (footnotes omitted).

the wishes of the Government expressed in the form of legislation, or the extent to which it can interfere with the pursuit of those wishes. Until now it has been a commonplace of political thought that although the United Kingdom might not have a written constitution its unwritten constitution was nonetheless based on fundamental principles. Amongst these principles were the sovereignty of Parliament and the Rule of Law. The centrality within the United Kingdom constitution of the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty has traditionally meant that Parliament can make such law as it determines, but the validity of such an interpretation has been questioned by some. The justifications for such challenges to absolute Parliamentary sovereignty are based on the United Kingdom's membership of both the European Union and the Council of Europe with the implications of higher authorities than Parliament, in the former's legislation and the latter's endorsement of inalienable individual rights. As for the Rule of Law, although it is a notoriously amorphous concept, it has provided the courts with scope for challenging the actions of the executive and, indeed, to a more limited degree, the legislature. The mechanism through which the courts have previously exercised their burgeoning constitutional and, by definition, political role is judicial review by means of which they have asserted the right to subject the actions and operations of the executive to the gaze and control of the law in such a way as to prevent the executive from abusing its power. However, such power has been greatly extended by the enactment of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998. The Act only came into effect in October 2000 so the question remains as to how the courts will use the powers given to them under that Act. The remaining articles in this chapter will consider the wider political context within which the judiciary operate as well as focusing on the Rule of Law and the HRA 1998. In an article 'Law and democracy', published in the Spring 1995 edition of Public Law, Sir John Laws, Justice of the High Court, Queen's Bench Division, considered the appropriate role of judges within the constitution from the perspective of the judge (footnotes omitted).

ABSTRACT

Sir John Laws, 'Law and democracy' [1995] Public Law, Spring, pp 72-93 In 406 BC, towards the end of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians were victorious in a sea battle at Arginusea, to the south of Lesbos. But 24 Athenian ships had been lost, with their crews. A north wind, of the kind that still today blows very strong in those beautiful but unpredictable waters, had hindered any rescue. In Athens, still governed by its direct democracy, the eight commanders were blamed. In their turn they blamed the trierarchs, the captains of individual ships. Proceedings were brought against the generals. The Council of the Athenians, which prepared the case for trial before the Assembly of the people, had yielded to public anger and decided that they would all be tried together, on a single motion. That was unfair and contrary to the law: each should have been entitled to have his separate case judged on its merite. A motion was brought to challenge the procedure as invalid. The presiding committee had to decide whether to accept this motion, or to allow an immediate vote on a resolution to try all the generals together. They were intimidated by

the people, the democratic voice. There were threats of impeachment and arrest. The presiding committee gave way. The eight generals were tried together on a single vote. They were condemned to death. Six were executed: they included the son of the great statesman, Pericles. The other two, as the historian Bury coyly puts it, 'had prudently kept out of the way'. But the presiding committee had not been unanimous. Unanimity was not required for their ruling. One member, the philosopher Socrates, had stood out against the illegal and unjust procedure for which the people bayed, although in vain. Afterwards the Athenians repented. They knew that what had been done was illegal. Socrates had been right, though when, seven years later, he reminded his own accusers of the fact, it did not save him from sentence of death. Democrats, no doubt, do not like to be reminded of democracy's failings.