ABSTRACT
T h e treaty of C ateau-C am bresis in 1559 between France and the Em pire, ending over six decades of in term ittent warfare, left Spain in uncontested control of Italy through its hold over Sicily, Naples and M ilan. U ltimately, this strength rested on Spanish naval suprem acy in the western M editerranean, and on a network of naval bases and friendly ports stretching from Andalusia to the straits of O tranto , and encom passing the Balearic islands along with Sardinia, Sicily and Corsica. O nly a relatively short stretch of the coast o f Provence, with the French bases of T oulon and M arseille, was in potentially hostile hands. T he success of Spanish and Im perial arm s in the peninsula did the rest. Venice w ithdrew from the contest in 1530. F rance’s Sienese ally was overwhelm ed by H ispano-Im perial troops with T uscan backing in 1555, and the Papal States fell into line after the death of the C arafa Pope Paul IV in 1559.1 Both France and Spain placed garrisons in Piedm ont, the la tter to provide an effective bulwark for Spanish power in M ilan. An alliance with G enoa further buttressed Spain’s central strategic position in Lom bardy. T h e republic’s prosperity depended on the lucrative asientos, or supply contracts of the Spanish m onarchy.' Free passage to M ilan through Liguria was an axiom of Spanish policy, and each time that access was threatened, the king held G enoa a little m ore tightly. Spain helped the republic secure the restless island o f Corsica, whose nobles plotted with the French and the Turks to throw off the Genoese yoke.3 Tuscany and the Papal States were kept respectful by strong
Spanish garrisons lodged on the T uscan coast, a t Piom bino, O rbetello and the island of Elba. Similar garrisons held strategic points in northern Italy, such as the Farnese capital o f P iacenza (until 1585), the crucial Ligurian port o f Finale, which linked the M editerranean with M ilan, and La Spezia, the alternative route to M ilan through the Lunigiana.
