ABSTRACT

General MacArthur had planned to put his 1st Cavalry Division ashore at Inchon well behind KPA lines as early as 22 July. Here he was certainly guilty of the most gross optimism or ignorance, for such planning had to be abandoned on 10 July as US and ROK forces continued to stream southward in defeat. But also on the 10th, an undaunted MacArthur met with the commander of the Pacific Fleet Marine Force, Major General Oliver P.Smith. With Joint Chiefs of Staff approval, General Smith promised that the entire 1st Marine Division, veteran of many Pacific War contested landings, could be in Korea within six weeks and in action by 15 September. (The “square” US Marine Divisions, with their four infantry regiments, were more “heavy” than their three-regiment Army counterparts.)

Planning for a landing behind North Korean lines resumed on 12 August and was completed in only one month. Operation Plan 100-B was codenamed Operation CHROMITE (originally and weirdly termed BLUEHEARTS). Planning was carried out by Far East Command’s Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group, under the control of FEC’s Operations Division. General MacArthur then divided his forces. On 26th August he established X Corps, composed of the 7th Infantry and the 1st Marine Divisions, with supporting field artillery and Combat Engineer units. The 7th was the last continental US Army division, along with the 82nd Airborne, not already committed to Korea and was seriously under strength until topped off with reinforcements, including KATUSAs. The Marine division, which was commanded by Major General Smith, was over-strength with the addition of the Marine Brigade (redesignated the 5th Marines). It numbered more than 25,000 troops, including some 2,700 Army personnel. To command X Corps MacArthur appointed his Chief of Staff, the prickly, hard-charging Major General Edward Almond. General Almond was an officer who in

imperiousness and vanity could be said to have out-MacArthured MacArthur. On occasion, ignoring the chain of command, he would go out into the field and tell brigades and battalions how to do their work. In this one aspect he was different from MacArthur, who maintained his Olympian distance from the front. MacArthur now had two independent commands under himself, a decision that would later have disastrous consequences.