ABSTRACT
It appeared at the end of 1983 that, although heavily committed, South Africa was still in overall control, with her wars either on or beyond her frontiers. The years 1984–8 were, however, to prove a watershed. The country had to face an internal implosion, the costs of the border fighting in lives, manpower and money began seriously to bite, and the correlation of forces tilted away from the SADF. The Force’s technical professionalism became insufficient to control the larger numbers opposed to it, with their modern Soviet equipment that South Africa could not match on account of the UN arms bans. From 1985 on, South African policies and strategy appeared more and more defensive, by the end of the decade rearguard. In the border war field commanders became more cautious, taking a step-by-step approach to ensure that if there was some internationally negotiated ceasefire they would not be caught at a disadvantage.
