ABSTRACT
Much of our discussion so far has been centred around two important issues in moral theory: that of whether there can be any objective basis for our judgements of right and wrong, and good and bad, and that of whether there is any credible theory that can determine what we ought to do. The first question is metaethical: it asks about the status of moral claims. Can they be literally true or false? If not, is there some other way in which they can be justified? Can there be a moral system which is objectively binding on all people in all places and at all times? The second question, as we have seen, concerns moral theory. Is there some theory – for example, “always promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number” – that can determine our duty? Both these questions have taken us to the heart of contemporary moral philosophy, and both leave us with seemingly intractable puzzles. On the one hand, it is initially hard to understand how evaluative judgements can be objectively true; on the other hand, even leaving the objectivity question aside, it is hard to see much resemblance between dominant theories like utilitarianism and the way most of our moral reasoning actually proceeds in everyday life. For most of us, the 160important moral questions we face are not about what to do when faced with the choice between causing one death and causing five, or between torturing a terrorist to gain life-saving information, and refusing to torture the terrorist at the risk that his hidden bomb goes off. They are really more like: should I open a bottle of wine tonight, or finish this chapter? Should I, out of benevolence, omit an unflattering detail about someone in a reference I write for her? What might be useful is some credible account both of the nature of morality and the nature of the good life that can speak to ordinary life.
