ABSTRACT
In April 2002, Dianne Pretty’s fi nal appeal for a ‘right to die’ foundered before the judges of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Mrs Pretty had motor neurone disease, a neuro-degenerative condition that progressively attacks the sufferer’s muscles, for which there is no cure. According to Mrs Pretty, she had ‘fought this disease each step of the way’ (Dyer 2002). She nevertheless knew that the disease would overpower her and she particularly feared the prospect of suffocating in the fi nal stages of her life. Mrs Pretty’s husband, Brian, confi rmed that he would be willing to help his wife commit suicide, but only if the legal offi cials would in turn confi rm that he would not be prosecuted. ‘If I am allowed to choose when and how I die I will feel that I have wrested some autonomy back and kept hold of my dignity’, said Mrs Pretty. ‘That is how I want my family to remember me – as someone who respected the law and asked that in turn the law respect my rights.’ (ibid)
The legal offi cials – ranging from the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), to the English Law Lords, to the judges in Strasbourg – denied that Mrs Pretty, or indeed anyone else, had a right to be helped to die. Legal backing did exist for a wide range of personal choices, including the choice to have life-supporting treatment removed, but respect for personal autonomy did not encompass or entail positive assistance in dying. To rule otherwise, thought the judges, would be to signal that life, especially a compromised life, is not intrinsically valuable, and so would undermine the respect and protection due to vulnerable patients. Less than two weeks after hearing that she had lost this battle, Mrs Pretty died.
