ABSTRACT
Becker’s verification model of word recognition (Becker, 1976, 1979, 1980, 1985; Becker & Killion, 1977; see also Paap, Newsome, McDonald, & Schvaneveldt, 1982) is commonly understood to explain semantic priming solely in terms of strategic processes (e.g., McNamara & Holbrook, 2003; Neely, 1991). The seeds of this interpretation are easy to identify. The model’s name, its use of serial comparison processes, and Becker’s comprehensive discussions of the role of attention in word recognition at time when attention was equated with strategies and consciousness have all contributed to the view that the verification model can only account for strategic semantic priming. I now believe that this interpretation is incorrect. In the light of research demonstrating the role of attention in semantic priming and the apparent dissociation of attention from conscious strategies (see Chapters 9, 15, and 17), Becker’s model has a surprisingly youthful countenance.
