ABSTRACT
Our self-concept is also contingent on memory (see also Ross & Wilson, 2000). That is, recollections of ourselves in the context of a past play a critical role in our understanding and conceptualization of who we are today. Unfortunately, memory may not be a particularly dependable base upon which to build our self-concepts. Indeed, it is now well-known that memory does not behave as if it were a passive video recorder. Rather, its content is influenced by our self-conceptualization at the time the event occurred, changes to our self-concept over time, as well as our selfconcept at the time we are remembering our past selves. Moreover, because both memory and self are dynamical systems, neither remain static during the interval between event encoding and autobiographical recall. In fact, both the content of memory and the elements that constitute the self are thought to change as a function of new experiences, knowledge, and reorganization of what already exists. Interestingly, such changes can include the creation of false memories about past events, false memories that tend to be constrained by our self-concept. In particular, false memories about our past are more easily thought to be authentic if they are consistent with our current view of ourselves (e.g., Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001).
