If a statement relates to the description of the subject matter of the contract, is this too fundamental a matter to be treated as no more than a representation? If the statement does relate to the identity of the very thing which is the subject of the contract, is it to be regarded as an absolute guarantee that what has been described will be delivered or is there room for the reliance-based approach of the majority? That reliance is a key factor even in relation to descriptive statements is also borne out in the following case: In Harlingdon & Leinster Enterprises Ltd v Christopher Hull (Fine Art) Ltd, the defendant company was asked to dispose of two paintings described in an auction catalogue as being by Gabriele Münter, a German expressionist painter. Hull, the owner of the defendant company had no expertise in this particular area. The paintings were to be sold at Christies. The plaintiffs were known to have an interest in German expressionist art and were contacted by the defendant. Subsequently, the plaintiffs bought the paintings, being aware that Hull had no interest or expertise in this type of art. A price of £6,000 was agreed for one of the paintings, but it was later discovered that it was not a genuine Münter. In an action by the plaintiffs against the defendant company, the Court of Appeal held that the descriptive statement did not give rise to an action for breach of contract. The reason for this was that, in order to give rise to liability, it was necessary for the descriptive statement to have been relied upon by the person to whom it was addressed. In the present case, it was sufficiently clear that the defendants did not profess to have any particular skill in relation to this type of art and that it was, therefore, not reasonable for the plaintiffs to rely on what the defendant had said: Harlingdon & Leinster Enterprises Ltd v Christopher Hull (Fine Art) Ltd [1990] 3 WLR 13, CA, p 18

DOI link for If a statement relates to the description of the subject matter of the contract, is this too fundamental a matter to be treated as no more than a representation? If the statement does relate to the identity of the very thing which is the subject of the contract, is it to be regarded as an absolute guarantee that what has been described will be delivered or is there room for the reliance-based approach of the majority? That reliance is a key factor even in relation to descriptive statements is also borne out in the following case: In Harlingdon & Leinster Enterprises Ltd v Christopher Hull (Fine Art) Ltd, the defendant company was asked to dispose of two paintings described in an auction catalogue as being by Gabriele Münter, a German expressionist painter. Hull, the owner of the defendant company had no expertise in this particular area. The paintings were to be sold at Christies. The plaintiffs were known to have an interest in German expressionist art and were contacted by the defendant. Subsequently, the plaintiffs bought the paintings, being aware that Hull had no interest or expertise in this type of art. A price of £6,000 was agreed for one of the paintings, but it was later discovered that it was not a genuine Münter. In an action by the plaintiffs against the defendant company, the Court of Appeal held that the descriptive statement did not give rise to an action for breach of contract. The reason for this was that, in order to give rise to liability, it was necessary for the descriptive statement to have been relied upon by the person to whom it was addressed. In the present case, it was sufficiently clear that the defendants did not profess to have any particular skill in relation to this type of art and that it was, therefore, not reasonable for the plaintiffs to rely on what the defendant had said: Harlingdon & Leinster Enterprises Ltd v Christopher Hull (Fine Art) Ltd [1990] 3 WLR 13, CA, p 18

If a statement relates to the description of the subject matter of the contract, is this too fundamental a matter to be treated as no more than a representation? If the statement does relate to the identity of the very thing which is the subject of the contract, is it to be regarded as an absolute guarantee that what has been described will be delivered or is there room for the reliance-based approach of the majority? That reliance is a key factor even in relation to descriptive statements is also borne out in the following case: In Harlingdon & Leinster Enterprises Ltd v Christopher Hull (Fine Art) Ltd, the defendant company was asked to dispose of two paintings described in an auction catalogue as being by Gabriele Münter, a German expressionist painter. Hull, the owner of the defendant company had no expertise in this particular area. The paintings were to be sold at Christies. The plaintiffs were known to have an interest in German expressionist art and were contacted by the defendant. Subsequently, the plaintiffs bought the paintings, being aware that Hull had no interest or expertise in this type of art. A price of £6,000 was agreed for one of the paintings, but it was later discovered that it was not a genuine Münter. In an action by the plaintiffs against the defendant company, the Court of Appeal held that the descriptive statement did not give rise to an action for breach of contract. The reason for this was that, in order to give rise to liability, it was necessary for the descriptive statement to have been relied upon by the person to whom it was addressed. In the present case, it was sufficiently clear that the defendants did not profess to have any particular skill in relation to this type of art and that it was, therefore, not reasonable for the plaintiffs to rely on what the defendant had said: Harlingdon & Leinster Enterprises Ltd v Christopher Hull (Fine Art) Ltd [1990] 3 WLR 13, CA, p 18