ABSTRACT
Then the learned counsel takes up a more hopeful position. He says that the damages are difficult to assess because it is impossible to say that the plaintiff would have obtained any prize. This is the only point of importance left for our consideration. Is expulsion from a limited class of competitors an injury? To my mind, there can be only one answer to that question; it is an injury and may be a very substantial one. Therefore, the plaintiff starts with an unchallengeable case of injury and the damages given in respect of it should be equivalent to the loss. But it is said that the damages cannot be arrived at because it is impossible to estimate the quantum of the reasonable probability of the plaintiff’s being a prize-winner. I think that, where it is clear that there has been actual loss resulting from the breach of contract, which it is difficult to estimate in money, it is for the jury to do their best to estimate; it is not necessary that there should be an absolute measure of damages in each case. There are no doubt well settled rules as to the measure of damages in certain cases, but such accepted rules are only applicable where the breach is one that frequently occurs. In such cases, the Court weighs the pros and cons and gives advice, and I may almost say directions, to the jury as regards the measure of damages. This is especially the case in actions relating to the sale of goods of a class for which there is an active and ready market. But, in most cases, it may be said that there is no recognised measure of damages and that the jury must give what they think to be an adequate solatium under all the circumstances of the case. Is there any such rule as that, where the result of a contract depends on the volition of an independent party, the law shuts its eyes to the wrong and says that there are no damages? Such a rule, if it existed, would work great wrong. Let us take the case of a man under a contract of service to serve as a second class clerk for five years at a salary of 200l a year, which expressly provides that, at the end of that period, out of every five second class clerks two first class clerks will be chosen at a salary of 500l a year. If such a clause is embodied in the contract, it is clear that a person thinking of applying for the position would reckon that he would have the advantage of being one of five persons from whom the two first class clerks must be chosen, and that that might be a very substantial portion of the consideration for his appointment. If, after he has taken the post and worked under the contract of service, the employers repudiate the obligation, is he to have no remedy? He has sustained a very real loss and there can be no possible reason why the law should have
leave it to the jury to estimate the value of that of which he has been deprived. Where, by contract, a man has a right to belong to a limited class of competitors, he is possessed of something of value, and it is the duty of the jury to estimate the pecuniary value of that advantage if it is taken from him. The present case is a typical one. From a body of 6,000 who sent in their photographs, a smaller body of 50 was formed, of which the plaintiff was one and, among that smaller body, 12 prizes were allotted for distribution; by reason of the defendant’s breach of contract, she has lost all the advantage of being in the limited competition and she is entitled to have her loss estimated. I cannot lay down any rule as to the measure of damages in such a case; this must be left to the good sense of the jury. They must, of course, give effect to the consideration that the plaintiff’s chance is only one out of four and that they cannot tell whether she would have ultimately proved to be the winner. But, having considered all this, they may well think that it is of considerable pecuniary value to have got into so small a class and they must assess the damages accordingly.
