ABSTRACT
Central to any study of constitutional law are the issues of power and accountability. The operation of executive power, therefore, has a major bearing on understanding our constitutional law. Yet the evolutionary process whereby power was transferred from an absolute monarchy to a bicameral legislature and then, it is argued, to an ‘elective dictatorship’ is dominated by convention. One of the most important of these conventions holds that Ministers of the Crown are accountable, both collectively and individually, to Parliament and that the Crown must only act as Ministers advise it to act. Even the Cabinet and the office of Prime Minister originate by convention of the constitution. In the 1960s and 1970s practitioners within our constitution, such as Richard Crossman and Lord Hailsham, argued that executive government had become adversely dominated by the office of Prime Minister. For many commentators the Thatcher administrations (1979-90) merely illustrated this final transition into Prime Ministerial government. Yet the manner of Lady Thatcher’s removal from power have led many academics today, such as Professor Geoffrey Marshall, to reassess the situation and conclude that the ‘Cabinet in Parliament’ is still the central feature of executive power under our constitution today. Nevertheless it is important to reflect upon the relationship between various Prime Ministers and their Cabinets to understand the significance of both.
